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INTRODUCTION

It is a rare thing when an attorney files a complaint ofjudicial misconduct
against a federal judge; only 1 out of every 83,000 licensed attorneys in the

United States do so in any given year.' For some, this is evidence that the
federal judiciary is in very good shape, policing itself effectively so there is
little to complain about.z Anecdotally, however, it is difficult to find an attorney
who practices in federal court who cannot relate at least one story about a
judge's outrageous conduct, often recounting how that attorney or a colleague
was victimized by the judge's behavior.
1. See JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILrrY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (2006)
[hereinafter BREYER COMM. REPORT], reprintedin 239 F.R.D. 116, 150, 152 (2006) (noting that
of the roughly 700 complaints of misconduct filed each year against federal judges (2,108
complaints were filed in the three year period of 2001-2003), only two percent ofthem (roughly
fourteen per year) are filed by attorneys). With well over one million lawyers in the United
States (the American Bar Association estimates the number was 1,162,124 in 2008), this figure
suggests that .0012% of the lawyers in America file complaints against federal judges each year,
and that assumes that each attorney complaint comes from a different attorney. See A.B.A. MKT.
RESEARCH DEP'T, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2008), http://www.abanet.org/
marketresearch/2008_NATLLAWYERbyState.pdf. Of course, if there are repeat filers in
this group, the proportion is even smaller.
2. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Politics and Progressin Implementing the Federal
JudicialDisciplineAct, 71 JUDICATURE 13,22 (1987) ("[Tlhe small number of complaints that
have survived to the investigative stage and the much smaller number that have resulted in
sanctions are proof, not of the councils' inactivity, but rather of the high caliber of the federal
judiciary.").
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Often, the gripes have nothing to do with ethical lapses. Attorneys will
complain about one judge who is a stickler on the rules or is unwilling to make
an exception on procedure or another judge who is too quick or too slow to
grant continuances. But mixed in, one is likely to hear complaints that may rise
to the level of actionable misconduct.
Such stories of judicial misconduct may include the salacious and
newsworthy, such as a judge's posting of sexually explicit material on the
Internet,3 a judge's soliciting bribes to cover gambling debts and making
fraudulent bankruptcy filings, or a judge's making sexual advances on court
staff.5 More common, however, are the accounts of behavior that only attorneys
would be fully aware of: judges' less visible, less public, and perhaps far more
common ethical lapses, such as playing favorites, evincing racial or gender
insensitivity or bias, or behaving abusively or arbitrarily from the bench.
However, as a rule, these attorneys do not take the additional step of filing
complaints against the judges, 6 and whatever misconduct they may recount to
each other rarely finds its way into the judicial disciplinary process.
The effectiveness of the judicial disciplinary process has been subjected to
criticism and scrutiny from time to time over the years. Most recently in 2004,
3. See, e.g., Scott Glover, 9th Circuit'sChiefJudgePostedSexually ExplicitMatter on
His Website, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/11/local/mekozinskil 2 ("Alex Kozinski, chiefjudge of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, acknowledged in
an interview with The Times that he had posted the materials, which included a photo of naked
women on all fours painted to look like cows and a video of a half-dressed man cavorting with a
sexually aroused farm animal.").
4. See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, FederalJudiciaryAsks House to Impeach Louisiana
Judge, NAT'LL.J., June 23,2008, at 8, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422429431;
see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Misconduct FindingsAgainst FederalJudge Forwardedto
House, A.B.A. J., June 20, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/misconductfindings
against federaljudge forwarded tohouse/ ("A[n] [impeachment recommendation] summary.
. says [U.S. District Judge Thomas] Porteous signed false financial disclosures to conceal
income and gifts he solicited from lawyers appearing before him, making it impossible for
litigants to seek his recusal in appropriate cases ....
The summary also says the judge
committed perjury in a bankruptcy case 'while continuing his lifestyle at the expense of his
creditors'.... Court papers say the panel found Porteous and his wife filed for bankruptcy using
the names G.T. Ortous and C.A. Ortous. The couple later amended the court papers and
supplied their real names. Porteous also was found to have concealed assets during the case,
failed to identify gambling losses and omitted creditors. He continued to get short-term loans
from casinos and renewed a loan six months before he sought to discharge his debts by signing a
form that said he was not contemplating bankruptcy.").
5. See, e.g., Marty Schladen, ProbeofJudge Goes Beyond Sex Allegations, GALVESTON
CouNTY DAILY NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008, http://galvestondailynews.com/story.lasso?ewcd=
efc95625a2bf886b&-session=TheDailyNews:4B5C49B0118801B6C9qipOA16A6F ("[U.S.
District Judge Samuel] Kent, 58, who was Galveston's lone federal judge from 1990 until last
September, is under investigation after his case manager, Cathy McBroom, in May accused him
of touching her in ways she didn't want."). Kent was reprimanded and took a four month leave
of absence from his duties on the bench. Id.
6. See supra note I and accompanying text
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Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, prompted by congressional complaints
about the judiciary's administration of the federal judicial misconduct regime,7
appointed a special committee chaired by Justice Stephen Breyer.8 The Breyer
Committee, which reported in late 2006, conducted a thorough-going inquiry
into the judiciary's handling of the misconduct complaint process and
concluded that, for the most part, it works quite well. 9 But we should not take
too much comfort in the Breyer Committee's conclusions; the most serious
deficiency in the judicial disciplinary process may lie outside the focus of the
Breyer Committee's inquiry, in the judicial misconduct that attorneys are
unwilling to report, even informally, and which therefore goes unacknowledged
and unaddressed.10
The problem of unreported judicial misconduct, largely overlooked by the
Breyer Committee, 1 is rooted in the reluctance of responsible parties, most
notably attorneys, to come forward and raise misconduct issues when they see
them. 1 There is little incentive for them to do so and ample reason for them to
keep quiet. Indeed, attorneys involved in the judicial misconduct process, even
those who are involuntarily involved as subpoenaed witnesses, can suffer
severe professional repercussions. The judiciary must confront and address this
problem, by finding ways to elicit such complaints and to protect the attorneys
involved, before it can defend the present system as sound.
7. Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal
Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POL'Y 325 (2008) ("At a
meeting of the Judicial Conference in March 2004, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner of
Wisconsin, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, lectured the judges about what he
viewed as the 'decidedly mixed record' of the judiciary in investigating alleged misconduct in
its ranks." (citing Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrenner Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional
Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary (Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Rep. Sensenbrenner
Remarks], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news031604.htm)).
8. BREYER COMM. REPORT, supranote 1, at 119 (describing the Committee's charge).
9. See id. at 123-26 (listing the findings and recommendations of the Committee).
10. The Breyer Committee devoted considerable attention to misconduct that is never
included in a formal misconduct complaint, but nonetheless comes to the attention of the chief
circuit judge. See infra Part 11.2. However, the Committee gave scant consideration to potential
misconduct that never comes to the chief judge's attention. See infra notes 82-94 and
accompanying text.
11. The problem was "largely," but not entirely, overlooked. The Breyer Committee did
acknowledge this issue, but gave it relatively little attention, apparently considering it to bze a
problem of minor importance. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
12. Richard L. Marcus, Who ShouldDisciplineFederalJudges, andHow?, 149 F.R.D.
375, 429-30 (1993) ("One [chief judge] reported that '[liocal lawyers are aware of the
[complaint] process, but don't use it, are afraid to antagonize the judiciary."'); Collins T.
Fitzpatrick, Buildinga Better Bench: Informally AddressingInstances ofJudicialMisconduct,
JuEGEs' J., Winter 2005, at 16, 20 (2005) (noting that chief judges may not "even know the
extent ofproblems unless lawyers and court staff overcome theirfearand speak up") (emphasis
added).
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At the very least, the judiciary can do much more within the current
structure to encourage and facilitate anonymous complaints. Unfortunately, the
Judicial Conference's response to the Breyer Committee report discourages
anonymous reporting and obscures its availability more than ever, which is
quite inconsistent with the spirit of that report and the substance of other
changes prompted by its findings.13 Presently, the attorneys who practice before
the federal bench, arguably those best suited to recognize judicial misconduct
when they see it, play the role of the three monkeys who "see no evil, hear no
evil, and speak no evil," or at least "speak no evil."' 4 Anonymous complaints
may be the best hope for obtaining attorney input and participation in the
misconduct process, and for that reason, the system will be far better served if it
welcomes them. The facilitation of anonymous complaints and the more
sensitive treatment of attorney witnesses are essential elements of a meaningful
judicial discipline system. The integrity of the judiciary and the public's
confidence in it require no less.
I.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

"[W]e must not be deceived.., into overlooking or underrating the real
and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for the law which
exists in the United States today., 15 So intoned Roscoe Pound in 1906 in
remarks to the American Bar Association entitled "On Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice."' 6 Dissatisfaction with the
courts, which persists over one hundred years later, perhaps in even greater
measure, 17 has much to do with the public's confidence in the judiciary. That
13. Under the current complaint process, a potential attorney-complainant is asked to
provide his or her contact information and sign the complaint. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILrIY PROCEEDINGS R. 6(d)

(2008) [hereinafter NEW MISCONDUCT RULES], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/
judicialmisconduct/jud conduct and disability_308_app_Brev.pdf. These rules, which
replaced the previous "Illustrative Rules," are binding for the federal judiciary nationwide and
provide greater detail for the judicial complaint process. See infra text accompanying note 61.
Rule 6(d) seemingly allows for anonymous complaints to be handled under Rule 5(b). See infra
Part IV.B
14. Herman v. Mercantile Bank, N.A., 143 F.3d 419, 423 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (referencing
the "[liegend related to the 'Three Wise Monkeys' carved over [the] door of Sacred Stable,
Nikko, Japan"). With respect to judicial misconduct, attorneys at least "speak no evil" in the
formal complaint process.
15. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729, 730 (1906) (remarks to the American Bar Association on August
29, 1906).
16. Id.
17. Sandra Day O'Connor, Fairand Independent Courts:Remarks by Justice O'Connor,
95 GEo. L.J. 897, 897 (2007) (quoting Roscoe Pound in remarks at a 2007 conference on the
state of the judiciary and opining "that Pound's words apply with at least equal force today as
they did in 1906").
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public confidence, in turn, follows from fundamental principles of judicial
accountability.
The years since 1906 have witnessed recurring criticisms of the federal
judiciary regarding judicial conduct and accountability. 8 Concerns in the late
1970s led to the adoption of the first legislation designed to heighten judicial
accountability.19 Ten years later, further concerns prompted the appointment of
a three-branch commission to examine that legislation's effectiveness.2 °
Continuing concerns in 2004 prompted this latest inquiry, which culminated
with the production of a high profile report that was overseen by Justice
Breyer. 21 A brief overview of this history is helpful in understanding the
perennial problem of the reluctant attorney-complainant.
A.

The 1980 Act

Prior to the administration of President Jimmy Carter, no means for
disciplining federal judges existed short of the extreme constitutional remedy of
impeachment. 22 As might be expected in the post-Watergate era, calls for
accountability of public officials increased in the 1970s, and Congress
responded with a variety of proposals for policing misconduct in the Third
Branch.23
After considering and debating the various proposals, Congress ultimately
enacted the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980 ("1980 Act"), 24 adopting, for the first time, a procedure by which
18. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods ofJudicialDiscipline,142 U. PA.
L. REv. 243, 243 (1993) ("Prior to the passage of the [1980 Act] .... many commentators
expressed the concern that a significant volume ofjudicial misbehavior and disability was being
ignored."); Carol T. Rieger, The JudicialCouncilsReform andJudicialConductandDisability
Act: WillJudgesJudge Judges?,37 EMORY L.J. 45,77 (1988) (questioning "the willingness of
judges to 'keep their own houses in order"'); R.C. Wynn, CallingforImpeachment,TEX. LAW.,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 2 ("[lIt is obvious that the judiciary is not capable of policing itself."); Rep.
Sensenbrenner Remarks, supra note 7. Earlier history of criticism and congressional initiatives
to more vigorously enforce judicial accountability, including Senator Tydings' efforts beginning
in the 1960s, is referenced in Stephen B. Burbank, ProceduralRulemaking Underthe Judicial
Councils Reform and JudicialConduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 283,
291-92 & nn. 24-29 (1982).
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See infra Part L.E.
22. Hellman, supra note 7, at 326.
23. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 291-308 (presenting a good overview of the various
competing proposals that ultimately led to the adoption of the 1980 Act).
24. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 [hereinafter 1980 Act] (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1988)), amended by Judicial Discipline and Removal Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §
402(a), 104 Stat. 5122, 5122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (2000)), superseded
by Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, ch. 16, 116 Stat. 1848, 1855
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federal judges may be disciplined short of impeachment.25 In the end, the
process was entrusted to the judiciary, based very much on concerns for
separation of powers and institutional judicial independence. 26 Nonetheless,
Congress promised to exercise continuing oversight over the entire judicial
discipline regime. 7
The details of the 1980 Act are thoroughly summarized elsewhere.28 For
the purposes of this article, a few basics will suffice. The process begins when
"6any person" files a complaint alleging conduct "prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts" with the clerk of the
United States court of appeals in the circuit where the judge sits. 29 The Chief
Circuit Judge then reviews the complaint and takes initial action, which, for
substantiated complaints, includes the appointment of a special investigative
committee to conduct fact-finding on the complaint's allegations. ° The judicial
council of the circuit then reviews the findings and recommendations of the
special investigative committee to determine whether discipline is warranted. 3 '
The details of the 1980 Act's implementation were the subject of rules
drafted by each circuit. 32 The Judicial Conference of the United States ("JCUS)
approved "Illustrative Rules" in 1986, amended periodically thereafter, for the
handling of misconduct complaints, but these "model" rules were merely
offered as a suggestion to the various circuits. 33 While most circuits adopted

(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)). It is important to note that the statute was recodified
by the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002 and moved to its current section in the United States
Code.
25. Hellman, supra note 7, at 326-27 (setting forth a brief history of the 1980 Act's
enactment).
26. S. REP. No. 96-362, at 7 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4321.
27. The legislative history suggests that Congress would exercise "vigorous oversight"
and would leave open the possibility of further amendments that were less deferential to the
concept ofjudicial independence if the judiciary did not adequately police itself under the 1980
Act. Burbank, supra note 18, at 288 (citing, inter alia,126 CONG. REc. S13,858, S13,861 (daily
ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 126 CONG. REc. H8788 (daily ed. Sept. 15,
1980) (statement of Rep. Butler)); Id.at 307-08 & nn. 100-06 (discussing Congressional
oversight).
28. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 7, at 330-32.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1988). Of course, complaints "directly related to the merits of
a decision or procedural ruling" are excluded. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(2). The only recourse for a
complaint based on the merits of ajudge's ruling in a case is reconsideration or appeal under the
regular judicial process.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5)-(6).
32. Hellman, supra note 7, at 327.

33.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING

OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY (2000) (on file at the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts and with the Tennessee Law Review) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE
RULES], superseded by the NEW MISCONDUCT RULES (2008); Hellman, supra note 7, at 327.
COMPLAINTS
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rules that closely tracked the Illustrative Rules,34the rulemaking power was
vested entirely in the respective circuit councils.
B. Impeachments of the 1980s
After fifty years without a judicial impeachment, the 1980s saw three
federal judges impeached and removed from the bench.35 Two of the
impeached judges, Harry Claibome of Nevada and Walter Nixon of
Mississippi, were convicted in criminal proceedings and were serving time in
federal penitentiaries at the time of their removal. Judge Alcee Hastings of
Florida was acquitted in his criminal trial but was removed nonetheless, in part
for lying and fabricating evidence during the trial itself.3 7
The 1980 Act played a role in two of these proceedings, but it certainly did
not explain the sudden spate of impeachments: "The act was invoked actively
in one case, [Hastings,] passively in another, [Nixon,] and ignored in the third[,
Claibome]." Nonetheless, for anyone concerned about judicial conduct, this
string of impeachments was troubling and emphasized
the need to police
39
judicial conduct more vigilantly in the future.
C. The 1990 Amendments to the Act
One of the most conspicuous embarrassments for the 1980 Act was that
misconduct complaints were never filed, and the Act's provisions were never
invoked, in certain high-profile cases, including cases involving judges who
were convicted of crimes and ultimately impeached. 4° The Act did not, on its
face, provide the chief judge jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of the 1980
Act absent a properly-filed complaint.4' Accordingly, when serious problems
34.

Hellman, supra note 7, at 333-34.

35.

MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JuDIcIAL IMPEACHMENT: NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 1 (1993).

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.at48-62, 140-41, 151.
Id.at 102, 115-16.
Id.at 14.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON JuDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NAT'L
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL (1993) [hereinafter KASTENMEER COMM'N
REPORT], reprintedin 152 F.R.D. 265, 273 (1993).
40. Robert W. Kastenneier & Michael J. Remington, JudicialDiscipline:A Legislative
Perspective, 76 KY. L.J. 763, 781 & n. 83 (1988) ("After Judge Claiborne had been convicted
and all his direct appeals had been exhausted, and indeed after he had commenced serving his
prison sentence, not a single written complaint was filed with the circuit against him. It was the
initial position of the Ninth Circuit that nothing could be done.") (citing Conduct ofHarryE.
Claiborne,U.S. DistrictJudge, District ofNevada: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong. 31
(1986) (statement of Hon. Charles E. Wiggins, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit) (stating that "there was general perception that the act was triggered by a citizen
complaint")).
41. 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988).
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with judicial conduct emerged, even when judges were criminally prosecuted,
some chief circuit judges found themselves awaiting the filing of a formal
complaint and feeling powerless to act until they received one.
In 1990, Congress amended the 1980 Act to remedy this weakness by
specifically granting chief circuit judges the power to "identify" a complaint
based on information that comes to his or her attention.43 The 1990 amendment
gave chiefjudges the power to act on those matters they learn of, often the most
44
obvious and notorious cases, without awaiting the filing of a complaint.
However, it did nothing to remedy the deficiencies in reporting actionable
misconduct. Those most likely to be aware ofjudicial misconduct, notably the
attorneys practicing before the federal courts and the court staff, simply would
not file complaints. 5

42. See VOLCANSEK, supra note 35, at 83 (discussing the situation in which "[l]ess than
one month after the trial [acquitting Hastings], Chief Judge John Godbold of the Eleventh
Circuit... reported at a meeting of the circuit judicial council in early March that Hastings
would presumably be resuming his duties because no complaint had been filed against him. That
night over dinner Judge Terrell Hodges of Tampa confided to Anthony Alaimo, his friend and
fellow judge on the council, that he would file a grievance against Hastings"). The implication is
clear that, absent a complaint, the chief judge would not have, and arguably could not have,
invoked the 1980 Act's procedures.
43. Judicial Discipline and Removal Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 402(a), 104
Stat. 5122, 5122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (2000) ("In the interests of the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts and on the basis of
information available to the chief judge of the circuit, the chief judge may, by written order
stating reasons therefore, identify a complaint for purposes of this subsection and thereby
dispense with filing of a written complaint.")), superseded by Judicial Improvements Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, ch. 16, 116 Stat. 1848, 1855 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 351-364
(2006)); see also Geyh, supra note 18, at 258-59 (discussing the situations in which a chief
circuit judge might file a formal compliant).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 402(a).
45. See BREYER Comm. REPORT, supra note 1, at 150, 152. Seventh Circuit Executive
Collins Fitzpatrick squarely raised this concern in 1988: "Why are there not more formal
complaints? First, attorneys are often reluctant to file a judicial misconduct complaint for fear
the judge might be prejudiced against their current or future clients." Collins T. Fitzpatrick,
Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported Informal Responses, 71
JuDIcATuRE 282, 282 (1988) (footnote omitted). One recent article in the Business Crimes
Bulletin discusses the Breyer Committee's interaction with the attorney's internal dilemma: "As
counsel in a hotly contested case, you suspect that the president federal judge has engaged in
judicial misconduct. What are your options? Should you overlook the alleged misconduct for
fear of incurring the judge's wrath and perhaps prejudicing your case?" Justin A. Thornton,
Complaints of JudicialMisconduct, 14 Bus. CRIMES BuLL. 3, 3 (2007). Thornton concludes
simply, and somewhat unhelpfully, that "[fliling a complaint ofjudicial misconduct is a serious
matter and may, or may not, be the right thing to do." Id.
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D. Kastenmeier Commission
The three impeachments of the 1980s revealed, among other things, just
how cumbersome the impeachment process was, particularly for the Senate.
With the prospect of future judicial impeachments, an assortment of reform
proposals emerged in Congress in and just before 1990, mostly constitutional
amendments.4 6 While none of these proposals got very far in the legislative
process, Congress did agree that the judicial impeachment issue needed a closer
look. Accordingly, it included language with its 1990 amendments to the 1980
Act creating a "National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal" to
examine the issues.47 The Commission would include representatives from all
three branches of government, law school faculties, and private law practice.4 8
Former Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, who had been involved with the
impeachments of the 1980s as a member of the House Judiciary Committee,
was tapped to chair the Commission, which became known colloquially as the
"Kastenmeier Commission. ' 49 Its charge was:
[F]irst . . . to investigate and study problems and issues related to the
discipline and removal from office of life-tenured federal judges[, s]econd,..
. to evaluate the advisability ofproposing alternatives to current arrangements
for responding to judicial discipline problems and issues[,50 and t]hird, .. .to
submit... a report on its findings and recommendations.
Among other things, the Kastenmeier Commission closely evaluated the
impact of the 1980 Act and how it was implemented. In 1993, the Commission
issued its final report, making a large number of recommendations but
generally "suggest[ing] that the judiciary was doing a good job" in shouldering
its responsibilities of self-regulation. 51 The Commission did express concern
regarding attorneys' reluctance to file complaints, however, observing that
"[t]he Act is obviously not serving its purpose to the extent that knowledgeable
individuals with meritorious complaints are unwilling to file them because of
fear of adverse
consequences to themselves or their clients once their identities
52
are known.

46. See KASTENMEIER COMM'N

47. 28 U.S.C. § 372.
48. See KASTENMEIER
49.
50.

REPORT,

supranote 39,

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39,

at 274-75.
at 267.

Id.
Id at 275.

51. Id at 362 ("The system of formal and informal approaches to problems of misconduct
and disability within the federal judicial branch is working reasonably well."); Heilman, supra
note 7, at 327.

52.

KASTENMEER COMM'N REPORT,

supranote 39, at 345.
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E. Breyer Committee

Unlike the Kastenmeier Commission, which included representatives of all
three branches of government, the Breyer Committee was ajudiciary-sponsored
initiative, staffed and carried out entirely by the Third Branch. Its charge was to
"look into the matter" of "criticism from Congress about the way in which the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is being implemented. 53 The
Breyer Committee interpreted this charge to ask the basic question of "whether
the judiciary, in implementing the [1980] Act, has failed to apply the Act
54
strictly as Congress intended, thereby engaging in institutional favoritism.,
Recognizing this as a narrow question, the Breyer Committee did not consider
the desirability of statutory amendments or otherwise examine alternative
approaches as the Kastenmeier Commission had done.55 Rather, the Breyer
Committee limited its inquiry to an examination of the actual implementation of
the present Act, mostly by reviewing the complaints submitted and critically
analyzing the judiciary's handling of each.56
The Breyer Committee concluded that the judiciary had "properly
implemented the [ 1980] Act in respect to the vast majority of the complaints
filed,, 57 but that the "high-visibility cases"-those that attracted the attention of
the media or Congress-were mishandled almost thirty percent of the time, an
error rate deemed "far too high. 58 Accordingly, the Committee made a number
of recommendations, including more aggressive and transparent action on
publicly known judicial misconduct matters as well as adoption of mandatory
and uniform national rules for handling misconduct complaints.59
Following Breyer Committee recommendations, the relevant Judicial
Conference committee drew up uniform national rules to replace the merely
advisory "Illustrative Rules."6 These new rules, which embody many of the
Breyer Committee's other recommendations, were circulated for comment in
December 2007 and were formally adopted by the JCUS in March 2008.61
53.

BREYER COMM. REPORT,

supra note 1, at 119 (explaining that Chief Justice Rehnquist

"asked the Committee to examine the Act's implementation, particularly in light of the recent
criticism, and to report its findings and any recommendations directly to him").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 120 ("The question is a narrow one. It does not ask us to rewrite the Act,...
consider revision of the ethical rules governing judicial misconduct, [or] study other similar
proposals for change. It does not seek comparisons with state, foreign or other disciplinary
systems ... [or] demand the assistance of academic experts.").
56. Id. ("It does require us to undertake a practical task, namely to examine the actual
implementation of the Act in practice and to provide the Chief Justice with our conclusions and
recommendations for improvement.").
57. Id. at 122.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 125, 150-51.
61. Hellman, supra note 7, at 329-30 (outlining the proposals from the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability and discussing the adoption of the
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However, because of the limited scope of the Breyer Committee's inquiry,
its report focused chiefly upon formally-filed complaints and notorious cases.
The Committee paid little attention to the problem of reluctant complainants or
to potential misconduct that goes unreported, either formally or informally.
II.

UNREPORTED MISCONDUCT

The reluctance of attorneys to complain about judicial misconduct appears
throughout the history of judicial ethics. John T. Noonan, Jr., a judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, described one such example in his
book on bribery:
Albert W. Johnson... had his own career of unrequited crime.... [His]
selection [as a federal district judge in 1925] was criticized by the local...
bar and press. In the next two decades Johnson's behavior far exceeded the
prophecies of his most pessimistic critics.... In 1933 Attorney General
Homer Cummings announced a federal inquiry ...but nothing came of it.
Only after he had been on the federal benchfor eighteen years did Johnsol
encounter a lawyer who became sufficiently aroused to bring him to book.
Judge Noonan has expressed his own surprise that so much time passed before
an attorney came forward to complain about Johnson's outrageous conduct or
to demand accountability, 63 but, then again, attorney reluctance has very deep
roots. 64
Indeed, the introduction of a formal complaint process in the 1980 Act did
little to overcome that reluctance. As early as 1990, Congress felt the need to
address the conspicuous underreporting ofjudicial misconduct; 65 even the most
notorious conduct-offenses that were grounds for impeachment-had gone
unreported through the newly-established judicial misconduct complaint
process. 6666 The 1990 amendments did not address the problem of reluctant
complainants directly, as already discussed, but instead created a shortcut by
new rules).
62. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBEs 572-73 (1984) (emphasis added). Congress investigated
the attorney's charges, and "[d]uring the subcommittee's hearings-indeed after a single day on
the witness stand-Johnson resigned, later renouncing even his pension rights to avoid any risk
of impeachment." Id. at 573.
63. Telephone Interview with John T. Noonan, Jr., Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (July 28, 2008) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review). Of course, this
incident predated the 1980 Act, and the lack of a formal reporting mechanism may have
contributed to attorneys' reluctance to complain about the bribery.
64. See infra Part III.
65. See supra Part I.C.
66. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. However, the lack of formal
complaints is not particularly surprising. Potential complainants who read in the newspaper that
a federal judge has been charged with a felony are unlikely to feel that it would be necessary or
even helpful to file a complaint alleging that the felony may constitute judicial misconduct.
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which a chiefjudge, if alreadyaware of the misconduct, could act on his or her
own initiative and "identify" a complaint.67
A. Three Categories of JudicialMisconduct
The 1990 innovation effectively distinguished three separate categories for
judicial misconduct matters that are relevant for considering issues ofjudicial
discipline.
1. Category 1 Misconduct - Formally-Filed Complaints
First are those misconduct incidents that are the subject of formally-filed
complaints. Such incidents are easily documented, and the Breyer Committee
devoted the bulk of its attention to evaluating how these were handled and
whether they were handled properly.68 We can call this Category 1 misconduct.
2.

Category 2 Misconduct - Issues that Come to the Chief Judge's
Attention Through Other Means

Second are misconduct incidents that never generate a formally-filed
complaint but are instead brought to, or otherwise come to, the attention of the
chief circuit judge through informal means. 69 For these incidents, the post-1990
statute empowers the chiefjudge to "identify" a complaint and thereby dispense
with the formal filing requirement.7 °
Once a chief circuit judge identifies a complaint, the full mechanisms for
investigating and adjudicating the alleged misconduct are triggered. 7 The
Breyer Committee examined a few of these instances, particularly the highpublicity cases that garnered significant press attention.72 The publicity
surrounding these incidents ensured that chief circuit judges were aware of the
situations, and the Breyer Committee specifically urged chiefjudges to quickly
identify complaints for these incidents.73

67.

Judicial Discipline and Removal Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (2000).
See BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 120-22 (describing the Committee's
method for choosing complaints and evaluating how they were handled).
69. See supra Part I.C. See generally Geyh, supra note 18 (detailing Category 2
misconduct reporting as an informal method ofjudicial discipline).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1); NEw MISCONDUCT RULES R.5 (2008).
71. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of JudicialEthics in the FederalSystem: A
Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. Prrr. L. REv. 189,2115-16 (2007) [hereinafter Hellman, A
Peek Behind Closed Doors] (providing an overview of the complaint procedures).
72. BREYER Comm. REPORT, supra note 1, at 173-74 (describing how the Committee
classified complaints as high-publicity and how these complaints were reviewed).
73. Id. at 125 ("Review Committee members should stress the desirability, in appropriate
cases, of... chiefjudges' identifying complaints... particularly where alleged misconduct has
come to the public's attention through press coverage or other means ... ").

68.
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This type of misconduct, which the chief circuit judge is aware of but for
which no formal complaint is filed, can be referred to as Category 2
misconduct.
3. Category 3 Misconduct - Misconduct Issues that the Chief Judge
Never Learns About
Third are the misconduct incidents that never see the light of day. These
incidents are never discovered, at least not by the chief circuit judge or anyone
else willing or able to address them.74 The Kastenmeier Commission gave this
category of misconduct only limited attention,75 and the Breyer Committee gave
it even less.76 This third specie of misconduct is the great unknown; we suspect
it is there but do not know its magnitude. Misconduct that is never raised with
or acknowledged by the judiciary can be referred to as Category 3 misconduct.
B. Is Category 3 Misconduct a Serious Problem?
In a recent conversation with Tom Willging, a key judiciary staff member
on conduct and discipline issues at the Federal Judicial Center, the author
unimaginatively characterized Category 3 misconduct as the elephant in the
room that no one was willing to acknowledge. Willging observed that "we
don't know whether it is an elephant or a mouse in the room, because we have
no current knowledge of how prevalent this third category of misconduct may
be.",77 He was, however, quick to acknowledge that this gap in the system is
something we can never be sure that we have addressed adequately.7
The Breyer Committee did not, in fact, ignore this problem completely. In a
brief section near the end of the report entitled "Dealing with problems not
likely to produce complaints under the Act," the Committee identified three
areas of concern that its analysis had not yet probed. 79 The first area is conduct
which does not rise to the level ofjudicial misconduct but needs to be corrected
74. Marcus, supra note 12, at 429 & n.180 (citing surveys conducted by the Justice
Research Institute which show that chiefjudges believe that there are valid judicial misconduct
complaints which go unfiled).
75. See KASTENMEIERCOMM'N REPORT, supranote 39, at 345-46. Less than two pages of
the entire 150 page report were dedicated to the disincentives for filing complaints and the
accompanying problem that misconduct will be perceived by a potential complainant but remain
entirely unaddressed. See id.
76. See BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 204-05. The Breyer Committee
apparently "considered studying this aspect of the problem but staff could not identify a
reasonable approach to studying the matters that would pinpoint the type ofconduct that should
be complained about." Email from Tom Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to David Pimentel,
Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law (Aug. 6, 2008) (on file with the Tennessee Law
Review).
77. Telephone Interview with Tom Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr. (June 10, 2008).
78. Id.
79. BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 204-05.
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anyway, such as bad manners or sarcasm.80 The second area includes actions
which appear to be misconduct but are actually merits-related and, therefore,
beyond the scope of the 1980 Act.81 The third area is the problem of Category 3
misconduct:
Third, other behavior that would seem to fall within section 351(a)'s
definitions may never produce a complaint because only the baris awareof
it, and lawyers are reluctant tofile a formal complaint about a judge before

whom they must appear regularly. A chief circuit judge said, for instance,
[i]f someone on the court of appeals is losing it or is out of control, his
colleagues see that. .

.

.If it's a district judge, often the judge's

colleagues are the last to know, so lawyers will come to me. [But
a]ttomeys and the bar don't want to file complaints against judges....
The lawyer's business is8 2to appear before the judge. The lawyer can't
blithely file a complaint.
In this passage, the Breyer Committee acknowledged the problem of Category 3
misconduct but failed to acknowledge its seriousness. While noting that the
district judges' colleagues are the last to know and that the responsibility for
reporting misconduct falls on attorneys, this chiefjudge observes that "lawyers
will come to me. ''83 Certainly if and when attorneys do come to the chiefjudge
on an informal basis, the problem can be appropriately addressed. Given the
strength of attorney reluctance, however, it is hard to imagine that affected
attorneys will be quick to approach the chief circuit judge.84 Indeed, the Breyer
Committee's response to this concern, or lack thereof,8 5 suggests that the
Breyer Committee, perhaps relying on this chief judge's statement that
attorneys do come to him, did not consider attorney reluctance to be a serious
problem in the administration ofthe 1980 Act. 86 Rather, the Committee focused

80. Id. at 204.
81. Id.(providing as a common example "judges' failure, typically inadvertent, to recuse
in cases in which they may have even very minor stock ownership in one of the parties").
82. Id.at 204-05 (emphasis added). This is not an excerpt; rather, this quoted passage is
the entirety of the Breyer Committee's description of the problem of attorney reluctance to file
complaints.
83. Id.at 205.
84. Judges may perceive themselves to be far more approachable than attorneys perceive
them to be. Undoubtedly, some attorneys who know the chief judge on the basis of a
longstanding relationship, personal or professional, may be comfortable approaching the chief
with an issue as delicate as, e.g. the alcoholism of a fellow judge. But it is difficult to imagine
that young attorneys, still trying to establish themselves in the legal community, would feel
comfortable making such an approach.
85. See infra Part IV.A.
86. It is not clear whether the Breyer Committee saw it as only a minor problem unworthy
of serious attention, or whether the Committee saw it as a problem beyond the scope of its
charge.
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far more attention on the chief judges' response to Category 2 misconduct,
87
giving relatively little attention to the need to uncover Category 3 incidents.
Because Category 3 misconduct is relatively unknown-be it elephant or
mouse-and difficult to address, 88 this area of misconduct is convenient to
ignore, and an uncharitable critic might accuse the federal judiciary of doing
precisely that. The scant attention given to Category 3 misconduct in the Breyer
Committee Report is particularly striking considering how painstakingly the
Committee analyzed the handling of Category 1 and Category 2 misconduct,
and the strength of its recommendations for addressing the deficiencies in these
first two areas.
The Breyer Committee did not ignore Category 3 misconduct completely,
however, and seems to concede that the problem is germane to the Committee's
inquiry. The Committee's almost dismissive treatment of the problem suggests
that the Breyer Committee saw Category 3 misconduct as a minor issue-a
mouse 8g-unworthy of the considerable time and resources that would be
required to address it.90 Accordingly, the Breyer Committee focused its energies
elsewhere, on issues more clearly within the scope of its narrow mandate.
In contrast, the Kastenmeier Commission was given a much broader charge
than the Breyer Committee: "[T]o investigate and study problems and issues
related to the discipline and removal from office of life-tenured federal judges
[and] . . . to evaluate the advisability of proposing alternatives to current
91
arrangements for responding to judicial discipline problems and issues."
Perhaps due to its broader focus or to its more generous time and resources, the
Kastenmeier Commission paid more attention to the problem of Category 3
misconduct, suggesting that it is a serious and genuine concern. In particular, it
drew upon studies conducted specifically for the Commission, demonstrating "a
widely shared perception that some meritorious complaints are never filed" and
87. It is possible that many of the attorneys' grievances about judicial behavior involve
merits-related conduct, which is not cognizable as misconduct under the statute. See BREYER
CoMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 204. Of course, merits-related conduct cannot be fairly
considered Category 3 Misconduct. To the extent that attorneys' reluctance to file complaints
comes from their recognition that a complaint is merits-related and not cognizable under the act,
such reluctance is entirely appropriate. This article should not be read to lament the failure of
attorneys to file meritless or frivolous complaints.
88. See infra Part IV.
89. The author's discussions of this topic with judiciary staff confirm that they uniformly
perceive Category 3 misconduct to be "closer to a mouse." Telephone Interview with Tom
Willging, supra note 77; see also Telephone Interview with Bret Saxe, Office of the Gen.
Counsel, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (June 24, 2008) (on file with the Tennessee Law
Review); Email from Jefflrey Barr, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to David Pimentel,
Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law (July 30, 2008) (on file with the Tennessee Law
Review) ("I believe category 3 misconduct is a mouse in any well-run circuit.").
90. Willging draws this conclusion. Email from Tom Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to
David Pimentel, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
91. See KASTENMEIER COMM'N REPORT, supranote 39 at 275.
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"a widespread reluctance among members of the bar to file a complaint," and
made specific recommendations for addressing the problem.9 2 Nonetheless, the
Commission devoted less than two pages of its over 400-page Report to the
Category 3 misconduct problem and its proposed solution. 93 The Breyer
Committee, in its passing reference to the problem, noted that the Kastenmeier
Commission's proposed solutions had not borne fruit, and contented itself with
an endorsement of those earlier, largely unimplemented ideas.94
The fact that we can never be sure of the extent of Category 3 misconduct,
however, does not mean that we can or should assume it away. Quite the
contrary, there are compelling reasons to believe that Category 3 misconduct
exists and is substantial. Chiefjudges themselves recognize that most genuine
judicial misconduct never finds its way into a formal complaint.9 When
interviewed for the Kastenmeier Commission, "[a] majority ofjudges indicated
that less than forty percent of the true misconduct coming to their attention was
ever the subject of a complaint ... .,96 One judge observed, "In my experience
here, the most serious allegations of misconduct never hit the complaint
process., 97 Of course, the judges can only comment on the misconduct that they
are aware of (i.e., misconduct in Category 1 or 2). Unfortunately, if the most
serious instances of misconduct come to the chiefjudges' attention outside of
the formal process, then we know we lack an effective mechanism for alerting
chiefjudges to such problems, and we can have little confidence that the chief
judges are always getting this information.98
92. Id. at 345.
93. See infra Part IV (discussing proposed solutions to the problem).
94. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
95. Geyh, supra note 18, at 256-59.
96. Id. at 259.
97. Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, DecentralizedSelf-Regulation, Accountability
andJudicialIndependence Underthe FederalJudicialConductandDisabilityAct of.1980, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 25, 131 (1993) (apparently quoting the same judge in an almost identical
statement); Geyh, supranote 18, at 256. Of course, these statements were made in the context of
asserting how informal methods can be used to address judicial misconduct, and the judges
making those comments may believe that they are, in fact, aware of almost all misconduct that
happens. Nonetheless, that does not diminish the fact that the formal complaint process misses
many instances of misconduct, and that the integrity of the system depends heavily on these
informal communications.
98. See supra notes 69 and 92. It is clear that some chiefjudges and court staff work hard
at opening the door to this type of informal communication. The Seventh Circuit, through
statements of its chiefjudge, as well as the work and reputation of its Circuit Executive, Collins
Fitzpatrick, has sent a message that they are receptive to such informal complaints. For
example, "Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, who presides over the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, asked lawyers and judges to be on the lookout for aging, cranky, deteriorating judges
who might need a call from the top judicial officer in the circuit." Lynne Marek, An All-PointsBulletin: Be on the Lookout for Aging, Cranky Judges, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 202421574442. While one may question Chief Judge
Easterbrook's use of the word "old" here, as it may suggest age-based bias, the message is clear
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Chief judges have also recognized that they are not hearing about all
misconduct and that they will not get this information unless attorneys can be
persuaded to participate in the process. Their frustration is evident in the
comments of chief circuit judges: (1) "[T]he bar knows the most about
misconduct; there must be some way to tap into that knowledge"; 99 and (2) "I
wish there were a vehicle by which lawyers could better air their grievances,
without the concern or fear of retaliation."' 00 Long-time circuit executive
Collins Fitzpatrick, who has extensive experience with the 1980 Act, has
expressed his concern that chief judges may not "even know the extent of
problems unless lawyers and court staff overcome their fear and speak up."''1 1
There is also reason to believe that sexual misconduct may be more
prevalent than is reflected in Category 1 and Category 2 reporting. In a
particularly thorough and probing background study for the Kastenmeier
Commission, Tom Willging and fellow judiciary staff attorney Jeffrey Barr cite
a chief judge who "expressed the opinion that such matters are the 'untold
story' of judicial misconduct." 10 2 Obviously, this chief judge was aware of
some sexual misconduct, classified as Category 2 misconduct, but this chief
judge appears to have the impression that more unreported sexual misconduct
is occurring. This concern was confirmed in the Kastenmeier Commission
hearings. Barr and Willging point out that "[t]estimony presented to the
Commission about allegations of sexual harassment of female law clerks by
federal judges10 3tended to corroborate the assessment that there was an 'untold
story' here."'
While these comments strongly suggest that some Category 3 misconduct is
taking place, the comments do not quantify the suspicion. Opinions vary widely
on the "elephant v. mouse" question. Most judges and judiciary staff appear to
adhere to the mouse hypothesis, convinced that word spreads about these types
of problems.'04 Whether word does get around to the chief circuit judge-and
whether we can build a judicial discipline system on the assumption that it

that Chief Judge Easterbrook wants to know of problems with the judges in his circuit and is
ready to act on such information if it comes his way.
99. Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 134 (quoting an unnamed chief circuit judge).
100. Id. at 191.
101. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 20.
102. Barr & Wiliging, supra note 97, at 142.
103. Id. at 142-43 (citing HearingsBefore the National Comm 'n on JudicialDiscipline
and Removal, 26-33, 59-76, 80-81 (Jan. 29, 1993) (testimony of Barbara Safriet, Associate
Dean, Yale Law School) (discussing the extent and nature of sexual harassment of female law
clerks by judges)).
104. See supranote 89. Judges, often dismayed by the audacity of attorneys who appear
before them, may find it hard to believe that these same attorneys are too timid to raise
complaints, at least informally. Of course, an attorney will be far more willing to stake out bold
positions when pressing the case of his or her client. The same attorney may well be loath to
raise the issue of misconduct to a judge absent a duty of zealous representation. See discussion
infra Part III.
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will-is a question that calls for empirical study.'1 5 It does not appear that
anyone has undertaken such a study to date; neither the Kastenmeier
Commission nor the Breyer Committee did.
In the meantime, judicial misconduct that escapes the attention of chief
judges, large or small, frequent or exceptional, is unaccounted for in the system
and for all practical purposes remains unremedied. Moreover, attorneys, those
most likely to be aware ofjudicial misconduct when it occurs, remain reluctant
to raise it.
I1.WHY JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT GOES UNREPORTED

Misconduct goes unreported when people who are aware of an incident of
misconduct choose not to file a complaint under the 1980 Act (which would
make it Category 1 misconduct) or otherwise bring the misconduct to the
attention of the chief judge (which would make it Category 2 misconduct).
While it is possible to posit a scenario in which no one is aware of the judicial
misconduct-perhaps if ajudge embezzles court funds so skillfully that no one
ever detects it-such circumstances are likely few and far between. In most
situations of true judicial misconduct, someone is aware of the misconduct and
often is aggrieved or at least disillusioned by it. 106 The misconduct remains in
Category 3, however, when that person chooses to keep quiet.
Most often, those close to the system, who watch judges in action and hang
on to their decisions, will be in the best position to see and recognize judicial
misconduct when it happens. Typically, these people will be the attorneys who
practice before the court.' 0 7 Chief judges have acknowledged that the few
complaints brought by attorneys tend to be the ones that require disciplinary
action. 08 One chief judge observed: "It's very difficult for a practicing lawyer
105. The empirical work could be done by an anonymous survey of attorneys practicing
before the federal courts. While the logistics of such a survey would pose challenges, there is no
reason to believe those challenges are insurmountable. The concern here is not so much that
such a survey has not been done, but instead that no one in the judiciary seems to think that one
is warranted.
106. The author frequently encounters lawyers who express skepticism that judicial
discipline procedures for federal judges can ever be effective in policing misconduct,
particularly for life-tenured Article III judges. This observation is not made lightheartedly as it
is usually accompanied by genuine regret, if not bitterness, about this "fact of life."
107. Court staffs are also extremely well-positioned to see and recognize judicial
misconduct when it happens. Much of the discussion of attorney incentives in Part .A. can be
applied to court staff as well. Certainly the potential for anonymous complaints would be as
equally applicable to court staff as to practicing attorneys. See generallyGeyh, supranote 18, at
257-58 (discussing court insiders, that is, court employees working alongside the judges and
how they may be even less likely to file complaints than attorneys because of the possible
negative consequences it could have on their careers).
108. Id.at 258; see also Marcus, supra note 12, at 375, 390 (discussing a Justice Research
Institute survey of federal judges in which a majority of surveyed chief judges agreed that
although some valid complaints are filed, "there are valid complaints that are not filed as well").

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:909

to file a complaint, they're in constant practice before the judge. Yet, those are
the complaints that tend to require some action or caution on my part."' 1 9
A.

The Problem of Attorney Incentives

1. The Value of an Attorney's Goodwill with the Court
To fully appreciate why attorneys are reluctant to file judicial misconduct
complaints, it is essential to understand the importance for an attorney to
establish goodwill with the court. As a practical matter, an attorney's greatest
asset, at least for a litigator or criminal law practitioner, includes the credibility
and respect he or she enjoys with the judges, particularly considering judges'
"human proclivity to be more receptive to argument from a person who is both
trusted and liked."' 10 Attorneys must cultivate that credibility and goodwill by
building it over time, indeed, over the course of a career.
Attorneys frequently seek and accept appointments to court committees
(usually on issues such as local rules or alternative dispute resolution) in order
to provide pro bono assistance to the court and build goodwill with the
judges.1" This is especially important for young or new lawyers12who are still
trying to establish relationships and reputations with the court.'
The eagerness of lawyers to ingratiate themselves with the bench is also
apparent in their sometimes obsequious behavior with judges. As one
commentator wryly observed:
No one has yet invented a protractor fine enough to measure the angle to

which even the most respectable lawyers bow and scrape before judges. No
matter what their personality, when approaching the bench they tend to sound
It is not clear from Marcus's description whether the judges are referring to the Category 2
misconduct that they hear of through informal means or whether they are referring to suspected
Category 3 misconduct of which they are never informed.
109. Geyh, supra note 18, at 258.
110. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES, at xxiii (2008) (emphasizing the importance of an attorney's relationship with the
judges and the court). Justice Scalia and Bryan A. Garner conclude the introduction to their
book by suggesting that some attorneys are inherently likeable and those who are not should
"work on it." Id.at xxiv. As explained, an attorney who is working to build trust and striving to
be liked by the judges should not antagonize them by filing misconduct complaints.
111. See, e.g., Taylor Pendergrass, Getting Something for Nothing: Pro Bono is an
Investment That Pays, 34 COLO.LAW. 85, 86 (July 2005) ("No price can be put on the value of
building a working relationship with court staff for new attorneys .... 'As a judge, I have taken
special note of those attorneys who appear pro bono, particularly in challenging, "high
maintenance" cases,' notes Judge Glowinsky. 'These attorneys stand out in my mind because I

recognize that they are providing an essential service to the courts and the community.').
Building a positive relationship and reputation with court staff and judges is equally valuable

for experienced attorneys.
112.

Id.
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like Eddie Haskell of "Leave It to Beaver" talking to June Cleaver. They
compliment the judge's appearance, lavish him with honorifics, pore over his
decisions,
praise his erudition, double over with laughter at even his lamest
113
jokes.
There are numerous times when an attorney's goodwill with the court will
be important, such as when the attorney needs an extension of time, an
emergency order, or any minor indulgence.'1 4 Judges exercise enormous
discretion in how strictly they enforce rules and when they make exceptions." 5
An attorney who has abused the court's goodwill-for example, by bringing
frivolous motions or demanding a hearing when in fact the attorney's evidence
proffered at the hearing is inadequate-will have a difficult time getting the
court's indulgence in the future.
In contrast, an attorney who has built a
reputation, usually over a period of many years, as a straight shooter and a good
citizen in the court community may get the benefit of the doubt in judicial
consideration of his or her special requests. 17
2.

The Loss of That Goodwill when a Complaint Is Filed

It goes without saying that much, if not all, of the attorney's goodwill,
which is so painstakingly acquired,
is lost when the attorney files a misconduct
n8
complaint against the judge. The Kastenmeier Commission, while discussing
113. David Margolick, At the Bar,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1989, at B9. Margolick goes on to
observe that unseasoned judges are not always "sufficiently self aware to realize that these
lawyers are groveling before the robes rather than the intellect." Id.For this reason, judges may
be inclined to overestimate the candor of the attorneys they speak with and correspondingly
underestimate the attorneys' reluctance to raise issues of perceived judicial misconduct.
114. Neil Dishman, DeadlineExtensions in FederalCourt: The Procrastinator'sGuide, 93
ILL. B.J. 354, 357 (2005) (explaining in his section entitled "Keep your district judge happy"
that "it is crucial to stay in the good graces of the district judge" for no other reason than the
discretion the judge uses in granting extensions). The importance of staying in the good graces
of ajudge similarly extends to any situation in which the judge is exercising his or her discretion
to grant or deny a request from counsel.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 897
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that because "counsel was late in filing papers with the court on a
number of occasions, he missed deadlines that he had requested, and he misrepresented to the
court the status of his application for admission to practice before it," the lower court judge did
not abuse his discretion in denying counsel's request for an extension of time).
117. See, e.g., Robb v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an attorney's reputation of being 'among the bar's most conscientious in
following... rules and meetings deadlines"' is a factor a judge can use when exercising his or
her discretion in granting an extension).
118. See, e.g., Marcus,supra note 12, at 429 & n.180 ("One of [the chiefjudges] reported
that '[l]ocal lawyers are aware of the [complaint] process, but don't use it, are afraid to
antagonize the judiciary."') ("Surveys done by the Justice Research Institute for the
[Kastenmeier] Commission confirm that lawyers are deterred from filing complaints by fear that
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the Department of Justice's role in judicial discipline, noted that DOJ lawyers
"will not risk souringrelationsbetween the Department and a federal judge by
making a complaint under the 1980 Act."' 19 In fact, the attorney who complains
may well alienate other judges on the bench who feel a kinship with their
20
colleague or who view the accusation as an attack on the bench as a whole. 1
Just as likely, other judges may become suspicious of the lawyer who dares to
complain about the bench, wondering if they may be next. Either way, it is
virtually impossible to imagine a scenario where the attorney who complains
about the conduct ofjudges on
the federal bench will remain in the good graces
121
of that bench after doing so.
The exceptional attorney who is willing to raise such issues may also
alienate fellow members of the bar.122 Few attorneys will want to be associated
their careers will be harmed."). Professor Marcus notes that even chiefjudges are reluctant to
file, i.e. identify, a complaint, preferring to address perceived problems in an informal way in
order to avoid confrontation with their colleagues. Id. at 417. He quotes one chiefjudge who
says, "[i]f you identified a complaint, you'd establish an adversarial relationship with the
judge," and another who notes that "a formal complaint might have gotten the judge's back up."
Id. Therefore, even life-tenured federal judges recognize that they lose goodwill with their
colleagues by proceeding under the misconduct statute. A similar fear applies a fortiori to
attorneys who appear in court.
119. KASTENMEIER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39, at 324 (emphasis added). The
Kastenmeier Commission recommended that the DOJ promulgate guidelines for its attorneys
but acknowledged that even "an explicit formal policy ... would not eliminate litigators'
understandable reluctance to risk alienating ajudge before whom they regularly appear." Id. at
326. The Commission Report goes on to observe that "[t]his problem, not unique to government
lawyers, is shared by the trial bar generally." Id.
120. This is the same "guild favoritism" mentality cited in the Breyer Committee Report.
See supra note 1, at 119. The Committee was concerned that the judiciary may close ranks on
the merits of the complaint itself. The closing of ranks can also play out in more general terms to
the detriment of the complaining attorney, as suggested here.
121. There may well be counterexamples. There are certainly scenarios where a judge's
misconduct is so egregious that fellow judges will welcome the filing of a misconduct
complaint. A miscreant judge tarnishes the image of the bench overall, and judges will likely not
close ranks around an embattled judge if the latter is bringing disrepute on the court and the
bench. In these situations, we have even seenjudges willing to file complaints against fellow
judges. See, e.g., VOLCANSEK, supra note 35, at 83-84 (describing how two judges filed
misconduct charges against fellow judge Alcee Hastings after Hastings's acquittal on criminal
allegations). Presumably, these judges would not have begrudged an attorney who came forward
to file that complaint against Judge Hastings. As already noted above, Hastings was later
impeached and removed from office. Id. at 115.
122. See, e.g., John Roemer, ForKozinski's Tormentor, It's Personal,DAiLY J., June 25,
2008, at 1 (describing how the attorney who publicized Chief Judge Kozinski's inclusion of
sexually explicit material on his private website was condemned by fellow bar members, who
"have trashed [the attorney] in virulent blog posts calling for his bar card or his head, or both").
In using this example, the purpose is not to take the side of this particular attorney, who may
well have ignoble ulterior motives in raising the complaint. Nor need we pass judgment on the
merits of that complaint, which remains pending before the Third Circuit Judicial Council, as far
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with the pariah who dares attack or accuse the judges. 123 This is another type of
"goodwill" that may be lost when an attorney files a misconduct complaint, and
the potential for professional isolation will create even stronger incentives for
lawyers to hold back.
There are undoubtedly examples of attorneys who have been victimized by
judicial misconduct and who have enjoyed the support of their colleagues in the
bar in their quest for justice, but these are difficult to document because of the
confidentiality of misconduct proceedings. 124 In the case of Judge John
McBryde of Fort Worth, who held an Assistant U.S. Attorney in contempt
when she refused to violate a sealing order entered by another federal judge in
another district, the attorney was in a poor position to undertake the risks of
25
filing a formal complaint; indeed, she had already been held in contempt.
The U.S. Attorneys of the two affected districts therefore cooperated with each
other by jointly filing a complaint of judicial
27 misconduct.' 6 This, however,
appears to be an exceptional circumstance. 1
3.

Incentives to Raise Issues of Judicial Misconduct

In their background study for the Kastenmeier Commission, Barr and
Willging analyzed the "Benefits to Complainants" in the current misconduct
procedure and found very little there. 28 The benefit to litigants, in particular,
"does not seem to justify the burden the Act imposes on the courts."' r29 Indeed,
"[t]he only benefit these complainants receive is the opportunity to articulate a
complaint about a trial judge's action and to get a response.... At least for a
moment, the complainant has captured the attention of the chief judge of the
circuit.' 30 For a litigant, this kind of attention may have value. 13 For an
attorney, however, the attention of the chief judge
is more likely to be the type
32
of attention the attorney must studiously avoid.1
as we know. The fact remains that his action, whatever his motives and whatever the merits,
prompted a strong negative response from fellow attorneys, a response he could have avoided by
keeping quiet.
123. Id.
124. See NEW MiscoNDucT RULES R.23 ("Confidentiality").
125. Christine Biederman, Temper, Temper: Judge John HenryMcBryde Ruled His Court
Like a Minor Despot,Angering Lawyers and Fellow Judges, DALLAS OBSERVER, Oct. 2, 1997,
http://www.dallasobserver.com/1997-10-02/news/temper-temper/.
126. Id.
127. For a counterexample, see infra note 200 and accompanying text
128. See Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 150-53.
129. Id.at 151.
130. Id.
131. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 429 ("[I]t is clear that some complainants have no
desire to maintain confidentiality. Organizational complainants may go so far as to call press
conferences to trumpet their accusations.").
132. See Geyh, supranote 18, at 307 ("The processes of mandamus, reversal, and recusal
require the victims of judicial misconduct to complain formally and on the record. Victims
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Attorneys, of course, have an investment in the integrity of the legal
system. It is in everyone's interest, on a macro level, for our judicial system to
function untainted by ethical lapses or other misconduct. 133 Every attorney who
is a part of this system-who spends his or her working life pursuing justice on
behalf of clients-benefits if corruption and misconduct are eradicated from the
courts. Restated, while attorneys may not want to file complaints of
misconduct, it is not because they don't
34 care; indeed, most are deeply offended
by unethical behavior on the bench.
Moreover, Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 8.3 places an ethical
duty on attorneys to report unethical behavior. 135 The jurisprudence on this
issue has developed mostly in the context of the parallel duty to report the
misconduct or ethical lapses of other attorneys. 136 The so-called "snitch rule" is
controversial in any case; even where the rule is in place, enforcement is
problematic. Indeed, it has been described as "one of the137most under enforced,
and possibly unenforceable, mandates in legal ethics.
Model Rule 8.3(b) extends the reporting duty beyond fellow attorneys and
also imposes a duty to report the misconduct ofjudges.138 Presumably, this duty
is even more difficult to enforce. In fact, the author has been unable to find any
instance where an attorney was disciplined for violating this or a similar
provision. 139 It is not surprising that bar authorities are slow to take up such
unwilling to risk alienating the judge before whom their case is pending or before whom them
may appear in future cases will not employ such quasi-disciplinary mechanisms.").
133. Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A CurrentLook at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It
Usedand WhatAre Courts DoingAbout It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 747, 766 (2003) ("The
public image of the legal profession is.. . enhanced as lawyers function within a framework of
integrity to provide consistently high levels of service to clients and the community at large.").
134. See supranote 106.

135.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

8.3 (2009):

(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.
(b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of
judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall
inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 or
information gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in an approved lawyers
assistance program.
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a). See generally Ott & Newton, supra
note 133 (describing recent developments in how courts treat instances where an attorney has
failed to report unethical conduct).
137. Ott & Newton, supra note 133, at 747.
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 8.3(b).
139. Ott & Newton, supranote 133, at 760 ("[O]nly two jurisdictions, Illinois and Arizona,
have sanctioned an attorney solely for violations of rules analogous to Model Rule 8.3,
[although] sanctions in conjunction with other ethical violations have become more common.").
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cases; sanctioning an attorney who has been subjected to the14misconduct of a
judge could easily be characterized as punishing the victim.
On the other hand, the duty to report judicial misconduct applies equally to
the attorney who may benefit from the judge's actions, where, for example, the
judge shows partiality on the bench. Here, of course, the attorney is not the
victim, but rather the beneficiary, of the misconduct. 141 Certainly, disciplining
attorneys for their silence would not be "punishing the victim" in those
circumstances, and an ethical inquiry against the attorney who benefits from the
judge's misconduct would be far easier to justify.
In addition, active enforcement of an ethical rule like Model Rule 8.3 may
not only coerce reluctant attorneys to report misconduct but also mitigate the
42
negative perception of an attorney who complains of judicial misconduct.
Whereas currently the attorney who complains ofjudicial misconduct may be
perceived as a whiner or a troublemaker, particularly by the bench, active
enforcement of a "duty to report" rule would make the attorney look like
43
someone who is simply trying to comply with ethical obligations.
Nonetheless, for whatever reasons, the various state bars are not pursuing these
cases.
4. Disincentives to Raise Issues of Judicial Misconduct
The most obvious disincentive to complaining of judicial misconduct, as
already discussed above, is the loss of goodwill with the bench. 144 However,
this characterization may understate the extent and intensity of those
disincentives, which relate to the attorney's standing and reputation in the
bar. 145 The experience of the "snitch rule" for fellow attorneys is instructive, if
not entirely analogous, in terms of both the difficulty of enforcement and the

These few cases arise out of the failure to report the misconduct of fellow attorneys, not the
failure to report misconduct ofjudges that is the subject of Model Rule 8.3(b).
140. An attorney who has suffered at the hands of a miscreant judge would present a very
sympathetic case if someone later tried to prosecute the attorney for failure to complain against
the judge. Given the fact that a decision to complain will almost certainly subject the attorney to
adverse consequences vis-i-vis the judge and the court, see supra Part 111.2, infra Part 111.4,
enforcement of 8.3(b) in this way would move that attorney from an unfortunate position to an
impossible one.
141. Of course, there are circumstances where a judge's misconduct benefits no one, such
as when a judge sexually harasses court staff or attorneys appearing before him. See, e.g.,
Schladen, supra note 5 (discussing the misconduct proceedings against Judge Samuel Kent).
142. Vivian E. Berg, The Snitch Rule: Does it Work?, 67 N.D. L. REV. 381, 383 (1991)
(commenting on how Model Rule 8.3 can "offer some comfort to the lawyer who decides to
report misconduct").
143. Id.
144. See discussion supra Part 111.2.
145. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IH.B (discussion of
ethical duties and ethical pitfalls).
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146
arguable unfairness and unreasonableness of expecting full compliance.
Indeed, whatever incentives may exist for attorneys to participate in the judicial
147
misconduct process, the incentives to keep quiet are far more compelling.
The problems and dynamics associated with reporting the misconduct of
fellow attorneys are quite different than those associated with complaining
about the misconduct of a judge. The term "snitch" conjures images of the
childhood classroom, where no one wants the reputation as a tattletale and
anyone who "tells on" his or her classmates risks social ostracism. 148 There is
little wonder that attorneys are reluctant to snitch on their colleagues. However,
reporting ajudge's misconduct is like going straight to the principal to tattle on
the teacher. Who has the guts to do that 1 49 "Suicidal" is the adjective that
comes to mind when thinking about an attorney's report ofjudicial misconduct.
While that term is certainly hyperbolic, as no one's life is actually threatened,
the consequences of filing complaints against judges could well threaten an
attorney's career. 150
The potential impact that filing a complaint of judicial misconduct could
have on an attorney's career cannot be overestimated. Consider, for example, a
judicial misconduct proceeding that took place in the Ninth Circuit during the
1990s.15 1 A judge was being investigated for alleged misconduct, and the
special investigative committee had come to town to take evidence, having
issued subpoenas to a number of witnesses, primarily practitioners in that court.

146. See generally Ott & Newton, supra note 133, at 749-54 (discussing the negative
ramifications that ensue for reporting colleagues' unethical conduct).
147. See generallysupra note 45 and accompanying text (listing rationales to account for
the dearth of attorney reporting).
148. Ott& Newton, supranote 133, at 753 ("Lawyers, who in many respects depend upon
their reputation among members of the bar and extended legal community, may think twice
about reporting the actions of another lawyer if the ripple effect of being labeled a snitch could
create havoc in their own lives.").
149. Indeed, even the chiefjudge--the principal in the school-may fear a hostile reaction
or retaliation and be dissuaded from taking appropriate action. As one chiefjudge put it, "If the
Chief Judge invokes the judicial council, none of the district judges likes it. You create more
problems than you solve, the hostility of the district court, and the Chief Judge of the district
court ... "Geyh, supra note 18, at 268 (quoting an unpublished interview with a federal judge)
(on file with Barr and Willging). Collins Fitzpatrick notes that even the chiefjudge may fear
retaliation: "Sometimes a chiefjudge does not want to take action against a problem judge who
is likely to be the next chief judge. Even though he or she is appointed for life, concern about
retaliation from the next chiefjudge can color the process." Fitzpatrick, supranote 12, at 19-20.
150. Indeed, the literature uses the word "suicide" in discussing this issue: "Ask a lawyer
how he or she feels about reporting judicial misconduct and see if the answer includes
'professional suicide,' a fate far from what anyone would-or should have to-contemplate
within allegiance to an ethical code." Berg, supra note 142, at 383.
151. The author was staff to the Ninth Circuit special investigative committee at the time
and speaks from personal experience with this most confidential matter. Care has been taken to
conceal any identifying facts in order to comply fully with the confidentiality provisions of the
Ninth Circuit's rules.
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One of the attorneys who was subpoenaed to testify seemed most reluctant, as
his testimony was not entirely favorable to the judge in question. He
nonetheless appeared and testified. After testifying, the attorney observed in
comments made off the record directly to the author that he would need to
relocate because he did not feel he could be effective practicing law in this
district any longer. While this might appear to be an overreaction, the problem
is certain to be more acute in smaller cities where there are few federal judges;
alienate one and it may be difficult to carry on a practice in that town. This
attorney witness did, in fact, move to another federal district within five months
of testifying-after the misconduct matter was resolved consistent with
52 the
testimony he gave-as did another attorney witness in that proceeding.
It would be nice if we could conclude that the repercussions for the
attorney witness ended there. Almost a decade later, however, the attorney in
question applied for an Article I judgeship in his new district and was surprised
to find his previous testimony come back to haunt him. 153 In the first question
of his interview for the judgeship, he was asked about his involvement in the
misconduct proceeding in his former district. 154 The attorney has credible
reasons to believe that his candidacy for the judgeship was harmed, at least with
regard to one influential member of the selection panel, as a result of this "taint
by association" with the earlier proceeding.15 This was an attorney who
testified involuntarily under subpoena. It naturally follows that whatever
152. Telephone Interview with Unnamed Witness (July 3, 2008). Because the judicial
misconduct proceedings were never made public, the proceedings and identity of the witness
must remain confidential. The comments discussed were made directly to the author, informally,
outside the hearing. These facts were confirmed in a follow-up telephone interview with the
witness on July 3, 2008. Id. The witness confirmed that the primary reason for his relocation
was the damage that he had sustained with the bench as a result of his testimony. Id.The witness
also confirmed that the other attorney witness had relocated shortly after the incident as well. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. It appears that the subpoena this attorney received and complied with continues to
have a serious impact on his career. If the judge(s) on the selection panel misused confidential
information or otherwise unfairly treated the attorney in his candidacy for a judgeship, that
conduct could be argued to be "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts" under the 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). But who will complain?
Certainly not this attorney. He has suffered enough from alienating the bench earlier, when he
had no choice but to appear and testify. The attorney believes he would only damage himself
and his career further, and probably irreparably, were he to file any type of complaint. Id.
155. Id. The sensitivity of this matter, and the confidentiality associated with it, makes it
difficult to be more specific about the basis for this conclusion. Certainly, there is no particular
reason to believe that this attorney would have been selected for the judgeship absent the
"taint." Undoubtedly, there were other highly qualified candidates. However, the fact that the
testimony was raised in the screening interview, apparently causing one member of the
committee to lose interest in his candidacy as a result of his involvement in the earlier
misconduct investigation, suggests that the attorney did indeed suffer some damage as a result of
his cooperation in the proceeding. Specifically, he may have lost the opportunity to be fairly
considered for the post.
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damage he suffered professionally as a result of his testimony would have been
far worse had he been the complaining party who initiated the entire inquiry.
The rules governing the administration of the 1980 Act go to significant
lengths to protect judges from scurrilous attacks by keeping the system highly
confidential. 56 There is virtually no corresponding sensitivity for the harm that
attorneys may suffer as a result of their involvement in the reporting process.
With the near certainty that an attorney will suffer professionally for any
involvement in the process, it is not surprising that attorneys would shun any
association with misconduct complaints or complainants. They may even go so
far as to openly criticize their colleagues who dare to complain,
thereby
157
reaffirming their distance from any proceedings that may ensue.
B. ConflictingEthical Duties
The pragmatic realities of legal practice are not the only factors at play
here; attorneys also have ethical obligations that must be respected, even when
it is inconvenient to do so. 158 But in this particular situation, there is no way to
err on the side of caution-in favor of ethical behavior-because complaining
about judicial misbehavior is every bit as dangerous ethically as keeping quiet.
1. Duty to Place the Client's Interests First
Of all the ethical duties that lawyers have, first and foremost is their duty to
the client, to represent the interests of that client, and to avoid conflicts with
those interests.159 It should be noted up front that raising an issue of judicial
156. See ILLusTRATivE RuLES R. 17 cmt. (2000) (justifying the strict confidentiality
provisions in Rule 17 by explaining that "[t]he statute and its legislative history exhibit a strong
policy goal of protecting judges and magistrates from the damage that could be done by
publicizing unfounded allegations of misconduct").
157. See, e.g., Roemer, supranote 122, at 120 (discussing the criticism Judge Kozinski's
accuser received from within the bar).
158. See supra text accompanying note 135-42 (discussing Model Rule 8.3(b)).
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009):
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations
and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the
client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a
result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with
others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting
about them to the client or to others.
However, comment [9] of the preamble recognizes that because of "the nature of the practice of
law,.., conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise
from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while eaming a satisfactory living."; see
also Fitzpatrick, supranote 45, at 282; Thornton, supra note 45, at 3-4 (discussing attorneys'
fears about harming current and future clients by a judge's retaliatory prejudice in response to
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misconduct can never further the interests of the client in the case. The
established jurisprudence of judicial misconduct makes it clear that the
misconduct process cannot be used to correct judicial errors in a case or to
reverse ajudge's determination.1 60 If ajudge's prejudice, bias, or neglect results
in an adverse ruling for an attorney's client, the attorney's only recourse-for
the benefit of the client-is the judicial process, e.g., an appeal. 61 Filing a
misconduct complaint may prompt some kind of remedial action to avoid such
problems in future cases or produce an apology, but it cannot go back
62 to redress
the harms caused by the misconduct in terms of adverse rulings. 1
With this in mind, the attorneys who zealously represent their clients may
actually face an ethical problem by filing a judicial misconduct complaint. 163 If
attorneys damage their clients' prospects in ongoing litigation by alienating the
judges of the relevant bench via a misconduct complaint, they may well run
afoul of the ethical obligations owed to the client. 6' The attorney who places
the integrity of the system over the interests of the client by choosing to file a
complaint ofjudicial misconduct does so not only at the client's peril, but also
at his or her own.
A cautionary tale comes from the example of Douglas Schafer, an attorney
who was disciplined himself after filing a complaint concerning a state court
judge's acceptance of bribes.1 66 Schafer's client had been involved in the

the filing of a judicial misconduct complaint).
160. See, e.g., ILLUSTRATIvE RULES R. 1(e) ("The judicial council of the circuit, the body
that takes action under the complaint procedure, does not have the power to change a decision
or ruling. Only a court can do that."); see also In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability,
137 F.3d 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1998):
A judicial misconduct proceeding, however, is not an appropriate avenue by which to
challenge the propriety of ajudicial decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1994) [now
found at 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006)] (providing for dismissal of complaint that is
"directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling"); D.C.Cir. Jud.
Misconduct R. 1(e) ("The complaint procedure is not intended to provide a means of
obtaining review of a judge's decision or ruling in a case.").
161. Other options, such as motions for reconsideration, motions for retrial, motions for
disqualification of the judge, etc., may also afford relief to the client. But again, these are
judicial remedies under established court process, not administrative action taken under the
misconduct statute.
162. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES R. l(a) ("The [1980 Act]'s purpose is essentially forwardlooking and not punitive. The emphasis is on correction of conditions that interfere with the
proper administration ofjustice in the courts.") (emphasis added); see also supranote 160.
163. See supra note 159.
164. See discussion supraPart 111.2.
165. See Thornton, supranote 45, at 3 (stating than an attorney risks "incurring the judges'
wrath and perhaps prejudicing [the] case" if the attorney files a misconduct complaint)
(emphasis added).
166. LaRue T. Hosmer & Daniel C. Powell, Schafer'sDilemma: ClientConfidentialityvs.
JudicialIntegrity-A Very Different Proposalfor the Revision of Model Rule 1.6,49 Loy. L.
REv. 405, 405-08, 411-26 (2003) (detailing the ordeal Schafer went through to have his
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bribery scheme, which is how Schafer learned of the judge's involvement. 167
Instead of supporting the attorney who was attempting to expose judicial
corruption, the bar's response was to investigate the attorney.168 In the end, the
bar disciplined Schafer for using privileged client information in his
169
misconduct complaint, information that he should have kept confidential.
The misuse of privileged information is a serious offense, and any good
intentions that he may have had in exposing judicial corruption cannot justify
his ethical lapse. However, it is also clear that Schafer could have avoided a lot
of trouble for himself if he, like most attorneys, had merely opted to keep his
mouth shut. Although this example comes from the Washington state
judiciary-not the federal system-it illustrates one bar's response when an
attorney attacks a judge. 170 There is no reason to believe that the outcome
would have been different had Schafer pursued a similar complaint against a
federal judge who was taking bribes.
2. Duty Not to Disparage the Court
Additionally, attorneys have an ethical duty not to make allegations with
"reckless disregard for the truth," as reflected in Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.2(a). 171 Thus, attorneys who make charges of judicial misconduct
need to be certain of the facts behind their complaint. How much additional
investigation to confirm suspicions and verify facts must an attorney do to
ensure that his or her judicial misconduct complaint does not violate this rule?
As Schafer learned, attorneys who dare to cast the first stone may well see
themselves-and their glass houses-come under a corresponding counterattack.
Consider as well the case of Stephen Yagman, an attorney who accused a
federal judge in the Central District of California of anti-Semitism and made
judicial misconduct complaint heard and the consequences he suffered as a result of his efforts
to report the judge's wrongdoing).
167. Id. at 405-06.
168. Id.at 406.
169. Id. It is worth noting that Shafer's initial complaint against the judge was dismissed,
and it was only because of his persistence in pursuing the issue after that perfunctory dismissal
(1) that the judge was ever disciplined for the ethical breach, and (2) that Shafer himself became
the focus of ethical inquiry. Id. at 411-23.
170. See also In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Cl. Ct. 255,262 (Cl. Ct. 1983)
(Judge Kozinski, then presiding over the Federal Claims Court, publicly reprimanded and
sanctioned two lawyers for bringing a judicial misconduct complaint under the 1980 Act that the
court deemed frivolous.); infra notes 172-78 (discussing the case of Stephen Yagman who was
disciplined for complaining about the federal court).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2009):
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,
adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to
judicial or legal office.
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other disparaging comments about the judge in a letter to a legal publisher.' 71 2
Yagman came under attack for "impugning the integrity of the court' ' 173 and for
attempting to create a basis for disqualifying this judge in the future. 74 After a
two-day hearing, the judges of the Central District of California attempted to
make an example out of Yagman by suspending his license to practice law in
that district. 75 After a protracted legal battle, Yagman was vindicated by the
Ninth Circuit, which (1) acknowledged that his allegations were protected
by
7
the First Amendment 7 and (2) reversed the disciplinary sanction.
Yagman can hardly be depicted as an innocent victim. His allegations were
personal, vindictive, and mean-spirited. Indeed, there was nothing professional
or praiseworthy in how he pursued this attack on the judge and the court or in
his dubious motives. Still, Yagman's case and all the publicity it garnered sent
a strong message to the rest of the bar: attorneys who dare to file an accusation
against a judge or a court will certainly draw unfavorable
attention to
78
themselves, including the possibility of disciplinary action.1
More specifically, those who disapprove of the decision to complain of
judicial misconduct, including people empowered to enforce attorney
172. After being sanctioned in one of his cases, Yagman was quoted as saying that the
judge involved "'has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers .... I find this to be evidence
of anti-Semitism."' Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, Refers Caseto State Bar,L.A. Daily J.,
June 6, 1991, at 1). He also sent a letter to Prentice Hall, publisher of the Almanac of the
Federal Judiciary, describing the judge as, inter alia, "ignorant, dishonest, [and] ill-tempered"
and referring to him as a "bully," "buffoon," and "sub-standard human." Id. at 1434 n.4.
173. Id. at 1436-37.
174. Id. at 1434 n.6, 1442.
175. Id. at 1435 (stating that "the district court held that Yagman had committed
sanctionable misconduct and suspended him from practice in the Central District for two years")
(citations omitted).
176. Id. at 1438-42.
177. Id. at 1445. Yagman has a more storied history in one of the more recent highpublicity misconduct matters as the accuser of Judge Manuel Real. See Henry Weinstein, Judge
Real's SanctionsAgainst Lawyer Killed but FeudGoes On, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at B 1.
He is the exceptional attorney who is willing to bring complaints against judges. Yagman has
now been prosecuted and convicted for crimes entirely unrelated to his misconduct allegations.
See Patrick Range McDonald, Hoisted by His Own Petard: Stephen Yagman's Outsize
Arrogance,Not His Politics, Done Him In, L.A. WKLY, June 27, 2007, http://www.laweekly.
com/2007-06-28/news/hoisted-by-his-own-petard/.
178. Perhaps it was too easy to find fault with Yagman. Yagman was known for filing, and
winning, civil suits against the Los Angeles Police Department. See McDonald, supra note 177.
Certainly his self-styled "whistle-blowing" activity should not have insulated him from
prosecution for crimes and other ethical breaches that he may have committed. On the other
hand, he, like Schafer, may have escaped notice if he had been willing to keep his mouth shut.
Id. (noting the conventional observation, which strongly implied in the Los Angeles Times's
coverage of the case, that "Yagman's renegade past ... was the prime reason he ended up in
court"). That is the inescapable lesson for other attorneys who watched the Yagman drama
unfold.
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discipline, may be quick to find fault with the accuser. Therefore, when an
attorney learns ofjudicial corruption, the attorney cannot raise the issue or file79
the complaint unless the attorney is sure that his or her own house is in order.
At the very least, accusers must conduct a thorough investigation to confirm the
accuracy of their suspicions.' 80 Otherwise, if the sources ultimately prove
unreliable, the accuser may well be found to have committed an ethical breach
for levying unsubstantiated accusations.'81
In other words, an attorney who is bound to report judicial misconduct
under Rule 8.3(b) may be similarly restrained from making any such report by
the strictures of Rule 8.2(a): "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the
lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge ....,182 The ethical
attorney may, therefore, be stuck in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't"
scenario, one in which additional inquiry and confirmation of facts surrounding
the misconduct will only make the attorney's position more difficult. Making
the extra effort to confirm facts will do two things. First, it will create the
impression that the attorney is pursuing a personal agenda to bring down the
judge, thereby exacerbating the damage the attorney will suffer with the bench.
Second, it will potentially remove any doubt that could justify inaction (failure
to file). Confirmation of the attorney's suspicions will paint the attorney into a
corner by invoking Rule 8.3(b)'s requirement that the attorney file a complaint
and accordingly suffer all the negative consequences of doing so. 183
With these as the promised fruits of further inquiry, the rational attorney
who suspects wrongdoing will not inquire further. Indeed, given the overall
balance of risks, it is no surprise that attorneys will almost always follow the
more conservative course-the path of least resistance-by turning a blind eye
to perceived misconduct and keeping quiet.

179. See John 8:7 (King James) ("He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a
stone at her.").
180. Compliance with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) will require this at a
minimum.
181. Professor Marcus refers to this particular disincentive in a slightly different context,
drawing on surveys of lawyers conducted for the Kastenmeier Commission:
Surveys done by the Justice Research Institute for the Commission confirm that lawyers
are deterred from filing complaints by fear that their careers will be harmed. As a
consequence, the possibility that sanctions might be imposed on complainants who make
groundless complaints seems ill-advised. For the truly vexatious complainant, it appears
unlikely that this prospect will hold much fear. For the diffident, such as attorneys, the
possibility of sanctions might put off even those who might otherwise come forward.
Marcus, supra note 12, at 429 n. 180.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2009).
183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(b).
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IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE RELUCTANT ATTORNEY
COMPLAINANT

The problem of reluctant complainants has no easy answers. Otherwise, the
problem would have been resolved much earlier by the 1990 amendments to
the 1980 Act, by the Kastenmeier Commission, or even by the Breyer
Committee. The 1990 amendments helped mitigate the problem of unreported
misconduct by creating Category 2, which furnished a means for addressing
misconduct absent a formally filed complaint.' 4 But the remaining problem of
the Category 3 misconduct still begs for attention.
A. Bar Committees
To address the disincentives for attorneys to come forward with complaints
ofjudicial misconduct, the Kastenmeier Commission recommended "that each
circuit council charge a committee or committees, broadly representative of the
bar but that may also include informed lay persons, with the responsibility to be
available to assist in the presentation to the chief judge of serious complaints
against federal judges." ' The JCUS formally endorsed this suggestion in
1994, urging the various circuits and courts to consider "whether and what
committee(s) or other structures or approaches, at the district or circuit level,
might best serve the purpose of assuring that justified complaints are brought to
the attention of the judiciary without fear of retaliation."
The JCUS endorsement was weak, of course, as it did not require the
formation of such committees, but only urged circuits and courts to "consider"
whether such committees or other approaches might serve the purpose of
bringing reluctant complainants forward.1 87 The JCUS's hopeful reference to
"other structures or approaches" seemed to acknowledge that the "bar

184.

28 U.S.C. § 351(b) (2006).

185.

KASTENMEIER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39, at 346. The proposed committee

would work with the Chief Judge not only to identify possible misconduct, but also to "educate
lawyers and the public about judicial discipline." Id. This idea for bar committees is much older.
It was mentioned as early as 1978-before the enactment of the 1980 Act-as a useful means of
alerting judicial councils to problems in the circuit, thereby helping the councils be more
effective in exercising their general supervisory powers. One proposal suggested:
Another step . ..would be the creation of committees in each circuit to consider
complaints from lawyers and the public.... It would be desirable for each circuit to have a
committee to handle complaints. To be effective, a committee must be well known by the
bar. Perhaps it is best for the committee to have broad responsibilities as a conduit between
bench and bar and to receive occasional, specific support from the chief judge.
STEvEN FLANDERS & JOHN T. MCDERMOTT, OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCILS 34

(1978).
186.

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 29

(Mar. 15, 1994).
187. Id.
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committee" approach was not a complete or ideal solution to the problem,
simultaneously emphasizing the paucity of ideas for fixing it.
The weakness of JCUS's suggestion may be partly to blame for the
underwhelming response of the circuits, at least in terms of the actual formation
or operation of such committees.' 88 As of 2005, eleven years after the JCUS
issued its endorsement of the concept, Fitzpatrick canvassed all the chiefjudges
of the federal circuits and observed that "no circuit has created such a
committee as of yet.' '189 The Breyer Committee offered little more. The
Committee only noted that one chiefjudge had proposed the creation of such a
committee to the judicial council in that circuit, suggesting "'Lawyers have fear
of retaliation en masse. . . Young lawyers are abused, they're afraid of
retaliation. Old timers don't care so much, they've arrived.... So you could
have older wiser heads be on such a bar committee.'' 190 Notwithstanding the
chief judge's support for the idea, that circuit's judicial council rejected the
proposal.' 91
The Breyer Committee acknowledged that this problem of attorney
reluctance persists, and made specific note of the Kastenmeier Commission's
proposed "bar committee" solution. It is worth noting that the Breyer
Committee was aware that the solution had been generally ineffective to date,
but the Committee had nothing better to offer. Instead, it simply re-endorsed the
bar committee approach in language that is again notable for its weakness: "The
councils should ask courts in the circuit to encourage the creation of
188. The Breyer Committee made the following observation: "[A]s far as we can
determine, the suggestion has been implemented in any form in only one circuit." BREYER
COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 217. Consultation with Breyer Committee staff identified the
particular circuit that reportedly had a functioning bar committee, but the Circuit Executive of
that circuit declined to confirm it. Email from Jeffrey Barr, supra note 89; Email from Tom
Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to David Pimentel, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law
(Aug. 1, 2008) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review). The Breyer Committee also pointed
out a district court that had apparently created the position of "ombudsman" to "act[] on an
informal basis to interface and address those matters lacking an institutional mechanism or
forum for redress," with the promise that all contacts with the ombudsman be kept confidential.
BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 205 (presumably quoting the district court's
documentation of its ombudsman office). Again, consultation with the Breyer Committee staff
identified that particular district, but the district court's newly revised website no longer
contains a reference to the ombudsman and emails to the district court asking for more
information were not answered. Even if the position of ombudsman still exists in that district,
however, it cannot be effective if the bar and the public remain unaware of its presence. One
might also argue that the ombudsman's jurisdiction would not include judicial misconduct
concerns, as the 1980 Act and its accompanying rules contain "an institutional mechanism or
forum for redress[ing]" judicial misconduct. Email from Jeffrey Barr, Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, to David Pimentel, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law (July 31,2008) (on file
with the Tennessee Law Review).
189. Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 20.
190. BREYER Comm.REPORT, supranote 1, at 205.
191. Id.
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committees of local lawyers whose senior members can serve as intermediaries
between individual lawyers and the formal complaint process."' 92 While the
Breyer Committee's approach constitutes a token acknowledgement of the
problem of Category 3 misconduct, it fails to bring meaningful emphasis or
attention to the issue. Moreover, there does not appear to be any reason to
believe that the suggestion will have any more impact now than it did fifteen
years ago when the Kastenmeier Commission and the JCUS initially proposed
and endorsed the idea.
One might well argue that the bar committee idea is not so much an idea
that failed as an idea that was never tried. It is certainly unpopular with the
judges.' 93 Otherwise, it could have and would have been attempted in a number
of courts already. 194
It is not at all clear that attorneys are any more enthusiastic about this
proposal than are judges, or that bar associations will be willing to play this
role. The chairpersons of these committees, whoever they may be, would have
to associate their names with the complaints against the judges, and senior or

192. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
193. In at least one circuit judicial council, the motion to create such a bar committee failed
for want of a second, suggesting that very few judges (only one on that council) favored the
idea. Email from Jeffrey Barr, supranote 89; Email from Jeffrey Barr, Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, to David Pimentel, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law (Aug. 15, 2008) (on
file with the Tennessee Law Review). In another circuit, the idea generated a very stronglyworded objection from authorities in the circuit responsible for judicial conduct matters,
suggesting that the disfavor is deeply felt. Id. The reason judges do not like the idea is not
entirely clear, although it is not difficult to speculate. Certainly some judges will resist the
notions of stirring up discontent or encouraging attorneys to find fault with judicial behavior.
Another possibility is that judges simply distrust attorneys and fear that empowering attorneys in
this way will only tempt them to use misconduct complaints as a litigation tactic or as some
other means of manipulating the judicial process. Id. (speculating on reasons for judicial
opposition). Of course, the bar-and any bar committee-will be intent on maintaining its
credibility and will therefore be unlikely to indulge frivolous or manipulative complaints. For
this reason, judges' fears would likely prove to be unfounded if a bar committee were ever
formed.
194. At least one alternative proposal for eliciting the comments of attorneys on the
conduct of federal judges met a similarly early demise. In the post-Kastenmeier Commission
era, then-Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace asked Ninth Circuit Judge and judicial ethics expert
John T. Noonan, Jr. to chair an ad hoc committee aimed at, among other things, addressing the
problem of attorney reluctance. Telephone Interview with John T. Noonan, Jr., supra note 63.
Judge Noonan proposed to his committee the idea of calling senior members of the bar in each
city to meet with a small committee of judges and have an informal discussion about the
performance of the judges in that area. Id. The hope was that the seniority ofthe members of the
bar and the informality of the "discussion" format might persuade the attorneys to be more
candid about these topics than they otherwise would. Id. The other judges on the committee
showed no enthusiasm for the idea, and it, like the Kastenmeier Commission's "bar committee"
suggestion, never saw the light of day. Id.
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not, precious few lawyers would want to assume that responsibility and the
negative ramifications it would entail.'9 5
In at least the publicized examples, the bar association's track record of
supporting attorney victims/complainants does not bode well.1 96 In addition to
the case of Schafer, discussed above, a particularly glaring example occurred
twenty years ago in the Western District of Pennsylvania. A federal judge told
plaintiff's attorney Barbara Wolvovitz in the middle of a jury trial that she
could not use her birth name in his court; as a married woman, she would only
be referred to by her husband's name. 197 Her co-counsel was charged with
contempt when he protested, and Ms. Wolvovitz was threatened with jail time
if she continued to use her birth name.1 98 The incident prompted outrage
throughout the country, and many people filed letters of complaint. The
National Organization for Women organized a protest in front of the
courthouse, calling for the judge's resignation. 199 While one would expect a bar
association to weigh in on behalf of its member, particularly in circumstances
as compelling as these, the Allegheny County Bar President was interviewed on
television about the incident and declined to support the attorney or lend any of
the bar association's legitimacy to her cause.2 This is a prime example of
when a bar association could have, and arguably should have, rallied around the

195. See discussion supra Parts 111.2, 4.
196. See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Douglas
Schafer, an attorney whose bar association chose to investigate and discipline him after he
brought a meritorious complaint against a judge for bribery).
197. Associated Press, U.S. Judge Won't Allow Lawyer "to Use that Ms.", N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 1988, at A23.
198. Id.
199. Telephone Interview with Barbara Wolvovitz (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
200. Id. Two weeks after the trial, the television program Pittsburgh 2Day had Ms.
Wolvovitz and a representative from the National Organization for Women ,who was calling for
the judge's resignation, as guests on the show. The program invited the judge to appear, but he
declined. However, Thomas Hollander, President of the Allegheny County Bar appeared and
defended the judge, stating:
The judge acted in a way following that that I think he deserves some credit for. He
apologized. That doesn't often happen with members of the bench and the fact that he did
so I think is a positive sign. He has served long, long and ably on the court. This is one of
those things that unfortunately occurred and not until this stage of his career, and he's been
on the bench for a long time. He is probably now sensitized to this point, and you will
probably never see it happen in his courtroom and perhaps probably in no other
courtrooms in Allegheny County.... We all reflect the times in which we grew up. I've
been blessed fortunately to have a wife and a daughter who keep me on my toes, but not
everybody does, and maybe not everybody in my generation shares my feelings.
Pittsburgh2Day (KDKA-TV2 television broadcast July 1988) (on file with the Tennessee Law
Review). Although the bar representative made important points and acknowledged that the
behavior could not be excused, it was clear that the bar would not take an active role in calling
for disciplinary action, even in this obvious and notorious case ofjudicial misbehavior.

2009]

THE RELUCTANT TATTLETALE

attorney to condemn a federal judge's behavior. However, it did not find the
will, political or otherwise, to do so.
One can only speculate what may have happened within the court during
this period as a result of all the letters and unflattering press coverage, but
something :Prompted the judge to completely reverse his stances and
apologize. 0 This is a good example of an appropriate outcome that was likely
spurred by the event's widespread publicity. Unfortunately, it does not appear
that the bar association was any help in pushing the court to deal with the
situation.
Only when the proposed "bar committee" approach is actually implemented
in a jurisdiction can we pass judgment on whether it is an effective solution to
the problem of reluctant attorney complainants. Clearly, the Breyer Committee
felt that it was the best available solution, but until the judiciary has the will to
try it, and unless the bar is willing to support it, we will never know. Up until
now, the idea has been a non-starter.
B. Anonymous Complaints
Another approach that might encourage otherwise reluctant complainants to
come forward is to explicitly authorize, and even encourage, anonymous
complaints. The Kastenmeier Commission noted that "Congress was urged to
permit anonymous complaints during the legislative process that led to the
[adoption of the 1980] Act, but the statute is silent on the subject., 20 2 Although
the concept of anonymous complaints appears to be fully consistent with the
statute, the judiciary has never been willing to endorse or encourage the use of
anonymous complaints as a proper means of raising issues of judicial
misconduct.20 3 The Illustrative Rules adopted by the judiciary in 1986 clearly
stated that "[a]nonymous complaints are not handled under these rules.
These rules also provided that the complaint "must
be signed" and that "[t]he
20 5
complainant's address must also be provided.,

201. Associated Press, FederalJudgeApologizes in Fightover Use of "M. ",N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1988, at Al0. The judge also announced his retirement less than four months later.
Associated Press, Judge in Sexist DisputeRetires, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1988, at 7. One cannot
know what formal complaints of misconduct may have been filed in response to the press
coverage. It is probably a safe assumption, however, that given the judge's apology and
retirement announcement, any such complaints would have been concluded on the basis of
corrective action taken. See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES R. 4(d) (2000) ("The complaint proceeding
will be concluded if the chiefjudge determines that appropriate action has been taken to remedy
the problem raised by the complaint .... ).
202. KASTENMIER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39, at 345.
203. See id. at 345-46 (discussing the judiciary's concerns about an anonymous complaint
procedure).
204. ILLUSTRATIvE RuLEs R. 2(g).
205. ILLUSTRATIVE RuLES R. 2(f) (emphasis added).
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1. Anonymous Complaints as a Means of Raising Misconduct Matters
from Category 3 to Category 2
There appears to be something slightly disingenuous about the Illustrative
Rules' prohibition on unsigned complaints. Because there was no statutory
basis for refusing unsigned complaints, the rules necessarily prescribed how
such complaints should be handled.20 6 Immediately after stating that
"[a]nonymous complaints are not handled under these rules," Rule 2(g)
specified that "anonymous complaints received by the clerk will be forwarded
to the chief judge of the circuit for such action as the chief judge considers
appropriate See rules 20) and 20.,, 2 07 Notwithstanding this provision, the
Illustrative Rules plainly discouraged anonymous complaints and obscured the
availability of this option to a complainant.
The Commentary to those Illustrative Rules also included a compelling
discussion of the merits of anonymous complaints:
Anonymous Complaints
Whether an anonymous complaint should be accepted is a question of
some difficulty. On the one hand, section 372(c) clearly contemplates a
complainant whose identity and address are known and who therefore can
receive notice of decisions taken, be offered the opportunity to appear at
proceedings of a special committee, and be accorded the opportunity to
petition for review if dissatisfied with the disposition of the complaint. On the
other hand, a prohibition against anonymous complaints may effectively bar
complaints from the two groups of citizens most likely to have knowledge of

206. Indeed, the statute has always provided and continues to provide that complaints may
be filed with the Clerk and must be forwarded to the Chief Judge, without distinguishing
anonymous from signed complaints. 28 U.S.C. sections 351 (a) & (c) state:
(a) FILING OF COMPLAINT By ANY PERSON.-Any person alleging that a judge has engaged
in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration ofthe business of the
courts, or alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason
of mental or physical disability, may file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the
circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such
conduct.
(c) TRANSMITrAL OF COMPLAINT. -Upon receipt of a complaint filed under subsection (a),
the clerk shall promptly transmit the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit ....
Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351 (a), 351 (c) (2006). Arguably, therefore,
the Illustrative Rules would have conflicted with the statute had they directed the Clerk to reject
anonymous complaints.
207. ILLUSTRATIvE RULES R. 2(g). Although the reference to Rule 20 appeared in the
original Illustrative Rules, the reference to Rule 20) did not. See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES R. 2(g)
(1986). Rule 2(j) established how a chiefjudge can identify a complaint absent formal filing. It
was added after the 1990 amendments to the 1980 Act created this possibility. Rule 20 was a
catch-all provision that made clear that the chief judge and judicial council can consider
information from any source, not just from misconduct complaints.
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serious problems in the administration of justice: lawyers and court
employees.
The resolution reflected in rule 2(g) is to require that complaints under
section 372(c) be signed but to make it clear that chiefjudges, as chairmen of
the circuit judicial councils, can, just as they always have, consider
information from any source, anonymous or otherwise. This solution is
consistent with congressional expressions of intention that informal methods
of resolving problems, traditionally used under section 332, should continue
to be used in many cases. Hence, under these rules, the formalities of the
statute would not be invoked by an anonymous complaint, but the chiefjudge
and the circuit council may nevertheless consider it. Information obtained
from an anonymous complaint could also provide a basis for identification of
a complaint by the chiefjudge under rule 2(j).208
This commentary clearly acknowledges a role for anonymous complaints
and sets forth the rationale for allowing them in this limited manner. It is worth
noting that the primary reason offered here for allowing some type of
anonymous complaint is that failure to do so "may effectively bar complaints
from ...lawyers.,, 209 The Kastenmeier Commission essentially agreed, and it
commended the procedure of forwarding anonymous complaints to the chief
judge for possible "identification" of a complaint, particularly as a means of
dealing with reluctant attorney complainants. 2 10 The Commission stated that it
"believes this procedure has promise in addressing the bar's unfortunate but
211
understandable reluctance to incur ajudge's hostility by filing a complaint."
Although it is difficult to find concrete examples, Barr and Willging cite
two circumstances where attorneys' inability to remain anonymous frustrated
inquiries or actions on allegations of serious misconduct. 2 12 In one case, "the
source was unwilling to come forward 'because he is a practicing lawyer' and.
. 'the realities of the law business all too often deter lawyers from publicly
coming forward with information critical of judges.' ' 2 13 In the other, the
complainant was "unwilling to reveal her sources.., unless she could do it in
closed session.., without the judge present." 214 Professor Marcus also cites an
example related to him by a circuit executive:
"A few years ago the Circuit Executive got a call from an attorney asking
whether an attorney-complainant's name would have to be disclosed to the
judge. The attorney was told that the practice in the circuit was that the

208.

ILLUsTRATIVE RuLEs

R. 2 cmt. (2000) (footnote omitted).

209. Id.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

KASTENMEIER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39, at 346.
Id.
Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 61-62.
at 61 (quoting the complainant in the case).
Id.
Id.at 62; see infra note 248 (describing this scenario more extensively).
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complaints were
21 5 not confidential; the response probably discouraged him
from filing.
It appears that the misconduct allegations were not considered on their merits in
any of these cases. The unavailability of anonymity served as a practical bar to
such consideration.
In contrast, Fitzpatrick cites a compelling example where an anonymous
complaint was received and proved to be highly effective in addressing a
misconduct issue:
[O]ne circuit chiefjudge received an anonymous letter criticizing ajudge for
the way he was treating lawyers in the courtroom. Rule 2(g) of the Illustrative
Rules provides for anonymous complaints to be given to the chiefjudge by
the clerk. Without accepting the veracity of the allegations, the chiefjudge
passed the letter on to the judge. A few days later, the judge called and was
thankful for the information. He had discussed it at home with his family.
216
They agreed he had been harsh, as he had also been harsh with them.
Although Fitzpatrick offered this example as evidence of the power of
informal methods for addressing misconduct issues, it is also noteworthy that
the complaint was raised and addressed through an anonymous process.
In addition, a chiefjudge who merely suspects that there is a problem with
one of the judges in the circuit may have those suspicions confirmed by an
anonymous complaint, or by a pattern of them. The anonymous filing(s) may
provide the impetus, or the excuse, the chief judge needs to identify a
complaint and commence the process. Anonymous complaints, therefore, may
be important in emboldening chiefjudges to take appropriate action, precisely
the type of action that they have been too slow to take in the past.21 7
2.

Obscuring the Anonymous Complaint Option

Notwithstanding Illustrative Rule 2(g) and its commentary on the handling
of anonymous complaints, the system clearly discouraged this form of filing.
Rule 2(f) required the complainant to provide their signature and address. 218 All
of the misconduct complaint forms contain blanks for the complainant to enter
his or her name and address.2 1 9 Even the rule that directed the clerk of court to
215. Marcus, supranote 12, at 429 (quoting an unnamed circuit executive whom he refers
to in the third person). This is offered as an example of attorneys' reluctance to complain if they
cannot file the complaint anonymously. It is also a compelling example of how judiciary staff
has apparently interpreted Rule 2(g) to say that anonymous complaints were not permitted, even
though there was a procedural route specified in that same rule that would get such complaints
to the chiefjudge for appropriate action.
216. Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 283 (footnote omitted).
217. BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 123.
218. ILLuSTRATTERULESR. 2(f) (2000).
219. ILLusTRATtvE RuLES app. 1.
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accept anonymous complaints and forward them to the chief judge began by
stating that anonymous complaints are "not handled under these rules. '2 0 In
these circumstances, an unsophisticated complainant would likely conclude that
he was not permitted to file an anonymous complaint.
The Breyer Committee did not explicitly comment on the desirability of
maintaining-much less enhancing-this mechanism for anonymous
complaints. The JCUS apparently interpreted this omission as a license to
further obscure the anonymous complaint option. 2
The newly adopted, and now binding, national rules for filing complaints of
judicial misconduct have completely buried the possibility of anonymous
complaints. No longer is there a rule entitled "Anonymous Complaints."
Rather, the relevant rule is titled "Complainant's Address and Signature;
Verification. 222 It provides:
The complainant must provide a contact address and sign the complaint. The
truth of the statements made in the complaint must be verified in writing
under penalty of perjury. If any of these requirements are not met, the
complaint
will be accepted for filing, but it will be reviewed under only Rule
22 3
5(b).

The rule no longer requires the clerk of court to accept the anonymous
complaint and forward it to the chief judge.224 However, Rule 5 provides that
anonymous complaints-now identified solely as "complaints that do not
comply with Rule 6(d)".-"must be considered under this Rule," suggesting
that the chief judge has an obligation to look at the allegations and decide
whether to conduct an inquiry and, possibly, "identify" a complaint absent
formal filing.225 Accordingly, one could argue that there has been no
substantive change to the rules in terms of the handling of anonymous
complaints. While the clerk no longer has an explicit obligation to forward
anonymous complaints to the chief judge, the chief judge does have an
obligation to consider them, which may amount to the same thing.
On the other hand, the message that anonymous complaints are unwelcome
is stronger than ever. The,,Illustrative Rules featured the words •"anonymous
226
complaints" in boldface as both a rule title and commentary heading. Now, a
potential complainant examining the rules and looking for an "anonymous
complaint" option, will no longer find that term in a heading or even inthe text
220.

ILLUSTRATvE

RuLEs R. 2(g).

221. Alternatively, perhaps the judges on the JCUS Committee on Conduct and Disability,
which drafted the new rules, simply viewed anonymous complaints as unimportant and excised
any references to them from the rules.
222. NEW MiscoNDUCT RuLES R. 6(d) (2008).
223. Id.
224. NEW MISCONDUCT RULES R. 8(a).
225. NEW MIsCONDUCT RuLES R. 5(a) & (b).
226. ILLUSTRATrVE RULES R. 2(g) & cmt. (2008).
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of the rules or commentary. Instead, they find Rule 6(d)'s insistence that "[t]he
complainant must provide a contact address and sign the complaint .... 227
The New Misconduct Rules struck the provision in the Illustrative Rules
commentary that explained why anonymous complaints may be desirable. 28
The complaint form attached to the new rules calls for the name, address, and
daytime phone number of the complainant. 229 Even a sophisticated
complainant, reading these rules, would doubt the appropriateness of
submitting a complaint anonymously.
The irony here is striking. The Breyer Committee strongly urged chief
judges to be more pro-active in identifying complaints,23 ° and the rules now
obligate, rather than merely permit, the chiefjudge to identify a complaint "[i]f
the evidence of misconduct is clear and convincing and no informal resolution
is achieved or is feasible. ' '231 These and other recommendations of the Breyer
Committee emphasized more active, robust, and responsive administration of
the 1980 Act.2 Thus, it is quite inconsistent with the thrust of the Breyer
Committee's recommendations for the Judicial Conference to bury the
possibility of anonymous complaints in its new rules. Moreover, as a matter of
policy, this move is most unfortunate and ill-advised, particularly as there is no
other meaningful innovation proposed to address the problem of Category 3
misconduct and the powerful incentives for attorneys to refrain from filing
complaints.
3. Problems with Anonymous Complaints
Encouraging and welcoming anonymous complaints is not a panacea for
the problems of Category 3 misconduct and attorneys' reluctance to come
forward and file complaints. The concept has weaknesses that deserve attention.

227. NEW MISCONDUCT RULES R. 6(d) (emphasis added).
228. See supra text accompanying note 208 (quoting the commentary's explanation in
full). Rule 6 no longer contains commentary beyond the simple statement that "[t]he Rule is
adapted from the Illustrative Rules and is self-explanatory." NEW MISCONDuCT RULES R. 6 cmt.
There is some commentary to Rule 5(b) that explains how complaints that "do not comply with
the requirements of Rule 6(d)" should be handled. NEW MISCONDUCT RULES R. 5 cmt.
Although this commentary makes clear that chiefjudges must act upon information that comes
to them anonymously, it never uses the term "anonymous" and is not associated explicitly with
Rule 6(d). Few complainants are likely to find this commentary and, even if they do, they are
unlikely understand it as an invitation to submit their complaint anonymously.
229. NEW MISCONDUCT RULES app.
230. BREYER CoMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 209 (recommending that "Review
Committee members should stress the desirability... of... chiefjudges' using their statutory
authority to identify complaints when accusations become public").
231. NEW MIscoNDucT RULES R. 5(a).
232. See generally BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 107-26 (stating that the
Breyer Committee generally recommended an increased adherence to the 1980 Act).
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a. There Ain't No Such Thing as an Anonymous Complaint

One major concern is that no complaint is truly anonymous.23 3 If a judge
makes intemperate remarks in a small hearing, and an anonymous complaint is
filed regarding the judge's behavior in that hearing, identifying the likely
complainant may be quite easy. After all, few people were present to witness
the incident, and even fewer were likely to take offense at the judge's particular
remarks.
Although this is undoubtedly true, it is in no way an argument for
prohibiting or discouraging anonymous complaints. The complainant runs a
certain risk of having his or her identity discovered when filing anonymously,
but if the complainant files in a regular fashion, which would require the
complainant's name and address, that risk is one hundred percent. The option
of filing anonymously can only encourage an otherwise reluctant attorney or
non-attorney complainant to come forward.
b. Problems of the Right to ConfrontAccusers
Another mfri
major
to anonymous complaints
is that they might
he ueobjection
uon
e' n h t
234
infringe upon the judge's right to confront accusers, a principle enshrined in
the Sixth Amendment.
Recognizing and responding to anonymous
complaints arguably exposes judges to wiles of mendacious complainants who
can avoid any responsibility for their perfidy by hiding behind the wall of
anonymity. The parade of horribles that follows raises the specter of the
Inquisition or witch trials.236
Although the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, by its very terms,
is normally applicable only to "criminal prosecutions,, 237 the underlying due
process implications deserve deference and attention. Indeed, one district court
has found right-to-confront-accusers protections in the terms of the 1980 Act
itself:
Fairly read, the Act requires that a judge under inquiry have the right to
confront all the evidence against him at whatever stage it is presented. This,
233.

See KASTENMEIER COMM'N

REPORT,

supra note 39, at 346.

234. The presumed right to know the identity of one's accuser has caused some
commentators to dismiss the idea of anonymous complaints without serious consideration. See,
e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 282 ("The reluctance of active attorneys to complain is
endemic to a system such as ours in which due process requires that the judge be informed of
the identity of the complainant.").
235.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

236. The author once had the temerity to suggest the idea of expanding the concept of
anonymous complaints in judicial misconduct proceedings to a federal judge. The judge
dismissed the idea out of hand, making specific reference to the Inquisition and the terrible
abuses that have resulted throughout history whenever anonymous accusations were tolerated.
237. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4 (1993) (noting that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply in forfeiture proceedings).
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of course, does not mean an accused judge has a right to re-confront old
evidence at every stage where it is considered. But ajudge under inquiry has
the right under the Act to confront at some point all the evidence against him,
and the Court so holds.238

In another case fifteen years later, the same court again acknowledged judges'
due process rights in misconduct proceedings, including the right to confront
witnesses, but declined to find a violation of those rights on the facts before
it.239

The Kastenmeier Commission acknowledged Confrontation Clause
concerns, but it qualified those concerns: "Fairness to a judge accused of
misconduct (or disability) ultimately requires that he or she be permitted to
confront an accuser, although there is no logical imperative that an individual
witness be identifiedas the initiatorof the process."'40Indeed, the judges' right
to confront an anonymous complainant is relevant only if the complaint itself is
treated as testimony or other evidence. If the special committee and judicial
council act after investigating an anonymous complaint, due process requires
only that they base their findings and decision on the evidence properly
presented and the testimony of witnesses whom the judge is offered an
opportunity to cross-examine. 241 The fact that the original anonymous
complaint cannot be treated as competent witness testimony does 24not
in any
2
way undermine the legitimacy of either the inquiry or the decision.

238. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1383
(D.D.C. 1984) (footnote omitted), aff'd in partand vacatedin parton othergrounds, 770 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,477 U.S. 904 (1986).
239. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135, 168-69 (D.D.C. 1999)
(recognizing due process implications in the judicial misconduct process, but refusing to find a
violation of the right to confront witnesses):
Finally, an alleged due process violation animates Judge McBryde's claims that the Special
Committee, and accordingly the Judicial Council, relied on hearsay and other
impermissible evidence in making its findings of fact. Thus, Judge McBryde maintains, he
remained unable to confront witnesses and evidence against him .... [T]he Court finds
that the hearsay, gossip, and other forms of evidence that may have contributed to the
Special Committee's findings remained so ancillary to the bulk of the evidence upon which
the Special Committee relied as not to present any potential due process violation.
240. KASTENMEIER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 39, at 345-46 (emphasis added).
241. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006) ("[I]t is the trial use of, not
the investigatory collection of, exparte testimonial statements which offends [the Confrontation
Clause].").
242. This is not a situation analogous to the "fruit of the poisonous tree." If a domestic
violence victim files a complaint and later decides not to testify, the police can certainly pursue
the prosecution based on other evidence that they may be able to gather. The fact that the
original complainant is not available for cross-examination should have no effect on the
proceedings overall other than to exclude that person's statements from the evidence.
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One might still complain that false anonymous complaints will subject
judges to the annoyance and frustration of baseless investigations. These
burdens will materialize, however, only if the chiefjudge finds the anonymous
allegation and supporting evidence (e.g., courtroom transcripts) sufficiently
credible to justify identifying a complaint and commencing an investigation.
Therefore, judges could be harassed and victimized by such baseless
accusations only if the chief circuit judge is willing to act on such allegations
or, in other words, only if the chiefjudge is defacto complicit in the campaign
of harassment.
The confidentiality of the process otherwise offers the judge adequate, if
not complete, protection from defamatory attacks from anonymous sources.
There is also no reason to believe that anonymous complaints would make a
chief judge any more likely to pursue frivolous and harassing investigations
against their colleagues. If the anonymous complaint is not well-grounded in
fact, the chief judge's preliminary inquiry should reveal its lack of merit
quickly enough and result in no action against the wrongfully accused judge.
If, on the other hand, the anonymous complaint is well-grounded, the chief
judge will benefit from learning of the existence of a problem, and even if the
chiefjudge is already aware of it, from additional background about its nature
and severity. After the chief judge's limited inquiry confirms that a potential
problem exists, the chiefjudge can use the acquired and confirmed information
to commence an investigation by appointing a special investigative committee,
quite independently of any testimonial evidence contained in the complaint.
The right to confront hostile witnesses is not diluted in any way by the fact that
the identity of the original complainant, whose testimony is necessarily
excluded from evidence in the disciplinary proceedings, is never revealed.
c.

The Influx of Anonymous Complaints May Overwhelm the System

Yet another concern is that opening the door to anonymous complaints
would overwhelm the system, inviting not only the complaints of Category 3
misconduct, but also a host of frivolous and vexatious accusations. Does the
judiciary have the staff and resources to process all of these, or would the
system cease to be workable?
One can only speculate on how many more complaints would be raised if
the judiciary were more inviting of anonymous complaints. Hopefully, the more
inviting approach would bring in any meritorious complaints of Category 3
misconduct, which is actionable but presently slips through the cracks. Those
will require serious work and investigation, as they should. However, an influx
of frivolous anonymous complaints is unlikely to overwhelm the judiciary's
resources because such complaints are so easily dismissed. Unlike a frivolous
formal complaint, which requires that a formal, reasoned dismissal order be
prepared and sent to the complainant,243 a frivolous anonymous complaint can
243.

NEW MIscoNDucT RuLEs R. 1l(g)(2) (2008) ("If the chief judge disposes of the
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simply be set aside-the judiciary wouldn't know who to send a dismissal order
to anyway. Accordingly, staff who process anonymous complaints can devote
their energies to verifying allegations-a far more meaningful use of their time
and energies-rather than drafting formal, reasoned memoranda dismissing
frivolous complaints. Likewise, if complainants under the current system opt
instead to file anonymously, the judiciary's overall workload could go down,
even as the number of complaints goes up.
All told, expanding the anonymous complaint option could impact judicial
staff quite positively, as they would spend less time churning out formalistic
dismissal orders for meritless complaints and more time verifying allegations of
true misconduct. In any case, the ease of handling frivolous anonymous
complaints should provide some offset for the increase in volume.
d. Attorney Witnesses Will Still Suffer, Even if the Complainantis
Protected
Of course, allowing complainants to remain anonymous will do nothing to
protect the attorney witnesses who may be subpoenaed to testify. The
compelling story of the reluctant witness in the Ninth Circuit misconduct
hearing, described above,2 " would have no happier ending if the complainant
in that case had been anonymous. An anonymous complaint process will not
solve all our problems;24 5 however, it can remove some of the disincentives to
filing the complaint in the first place.
Additionally, steps can and should be taken to protect attorney witnesses
who are victimized in the process. Again, the judges administering the 1980
Act must act with sensitivity, not just for the plight of a judge who has been
implicated in the judicial misconduct process, but also for the plight of
attorneys who testify (perhaps unwillingly) in that process.
The process already allows a special investigative246committee to exercise
tremendous flexibility in conducting the investigation, and it is by no means
necessary that a committee call the reluctant witnesses to testify before a panel
of investigating judges and the judge who is the subject of the complaint.2 47

complaint ... , the chief judge must prepare a supporting memorandum that sets forth the
reasons for the disposition.").
244. See supratext accompanying notes 151-55.
245. Also already noted, the anonymous complaint option may not help if the
circumstances of the complaint point too obviously to the probable complainant. See supra Part
IV.B.3.a. But as discussed in that Part, it is not a sufficient reason to reject the possibility of
anonymous complaints.
246. See NEW MiscoNDucT RULES R. 13(a) ("Each special committee must determine the
appropriate extent and methods of the investigation in light of the allegations of the
complaint."); see also Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 121 ("The field study revealed...
what general procedures special committees had followed [and] showed that there has been
considerable experimentation within the basic limits established by the Act.").
247. See NEW MiscoNDucT RuLE-s R. 13(c) (providing that "[t]he committee may arrange
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Barr and Willging note, for example, that an attorney witness who was
unwilling to testify in the presence of the judge accused of misconduct, could
have, and probably should have, been permitted to do so. 2 4 8 Some circuits have
made a practice of "engag[ing] . . . an outside attorney-investigator to

investigate the allegations of the complaint on the committee's behalf.' ,249 In
fact, one of the most exhaustive investigations ever conducted under the 1980
Act-Alcee
Hastings in the Eleventh Circuit-was conducted mostly in this
25 0
manner.
An attorney retained to conduct an investigation for the special committee
can collect a substantial amount of information from attorneys without
compromising their standing with the bench. As of 1993, at least three circuits
had employed this practice in eight separate misconduct matters:
In... three circuits, investigators have been hired in most special committee
proceedings ....

In some of these .

. . ,

the investigator conducted a

preliminary investigation, performing such tasks as interviewing witnesses,
developing and reviewing evidence, and presenting a report to the committee.

for staff assistance to conduct the investigation," including the hiring of special staff for this
purpose).
248. Barr& Wiling, supra note 97, at 61-62; see also supratext accompanying note 213
(referring to the case). Barr and Willging criticize the special committee for not allowing the
witness to testify in a closed session:
The chief judge, without any inquiry into the complaint, appointed a special committee,

which sent a letter to the complainant asking for clarification and additional information
about this and other charges. The complainant responded that she was unwilling to reveal
her sources of information about this charge unless she could do it in closed a session
before the special committee without the judge present. The special committee did not
accept the complainant's offer, nor did it hold further proceedings. Following receipt of the
special committee report, the judicial council dismissed the complaint in a conclusory,
three-paragraph form order as "not cognizable under the Act."
The rationale for the council's order is not clear. If the judge had a right to be present at
any committee proceeding, then the committee could not have agreed to complainant's
offered procedure without violating the judge's rights. The stronger position, however, is
that the judge had no right to be present atpurely investigative interviews conducted by
the committee. Thus, the committee may have erred in not agreeing to hear whatever
evidence the complainant could marshal in a closed session without the judge present.
Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 61-62 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing
ILLUSTRATVE RULES R. 12 cmt. (2000) (stating that the requirement that the judge be permitted
to attended certain proceedings did not apply to "meetings at which the committee is engaged in
investigative activity")).
249. Id. at 121.
250. VOLCANSEY, supra note 35, at 84-85 (noting that the special investigative committee
"engaged the services of John Doar, who had gained a national reputation for his investigation
of the Watergate scandal, and his associate Stewart Webb to conduct the investigation").
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... In one matter, the special committee delegated to the25investigator the
responsibility of conducting the entire evidentiary hearing. 1
Indeed, after the investigator thoroughly examines all potential witnesses,
the committee may be able to convene a hearing that calls only those whose
testimony relates most directly and relevantly to the charge.
These few
witnesses may be "confronted" and cross-examined, while many other attorney
witnesses can be spared the attendant negative repercussions of testifying
before the committee and in the presence of the judge being investigated.253
Out of deference to the particular interests of practicing lawyers, whose
careers can be jeopardized by participating in the judicial misconduct process,
special investigative committees should approach their task with care. Both the
reliance on investigators or other retained counsel to collect background facts
and evidence and the careful paring of witness lists may spare many lawyers the
unnecessary loss of goodwill that would otherwise inevitably follow their
testimony. Judicial councils should also consider granting recusal rights to
participating lawyers, as has happened in a couple of highly publicized
misconduct matters.2 54 The judiciary must, in any case, demonstrate its
sensitivity to attorneys' interest in retaining the goodwill they have established
with the court and the bar. Lawyer confidence in that sensitivity is essential if
attorney cooperation is to be secured in addressing judicial misconduct
concerns in the future.

251. Barr & Willging, supra note 97, at 121-22. Professor Hellman notes that in the
handling of the complaint against Judge Jon P. McCalla in 2001, "[t]he special committee hired
an outside counsel, who interviewed numerous witnesses." Hellman, A Peek Behind Closed
Doors, supra note 71, at 238.
252. See VOLcANSEK, supra note 35, at 94. In one of the investigations of Alcee Hastings,
the hearings before the special committee of judges, in which Hastings present, were brief.
"Only seven witnesses were presented, although the investigationhad cast a much wider net,
and only three of these had a direct impact on the committee's work." Id. (emphasis added).
Conducting the investigation in this way minimized the number of witnessed forced to
participate in the formal hearing process.
253. The unnamed attorney-witness discussed supra at notes 151-55 specifically
recommended this approach. He believes it might have spared him the professional setbacks
caused by his testimony.
254. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (The judicial
council ordered, among other things, that Judge McBryde "not be allowed for three years to
preside over cases involving any of 23 lawyers who had participated in the investigation.");
Hellman, A Peek Behind Closed Doors, supra note 71, at 239 (discussing the judicial
misconduct proceedings against Judge Jon P. McCalla in the Western District of Tennessee,
who is prohibited from hearing cases involving certain lawyers "because of past conflicts").
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CONCLUSION

While the various examinations of the federal judicial discipline process
have been, for the most part, thorough and well-conceived, they have largely
neglected the problem of the reluctant attorney complainant. Neither the
Kastenmeier Commission nor the Breyer Committee offered an effective
solution. Attorneys fear any involvement in the judicial disciplinary process,
and with good reason. Any venture to initiate judicial misconduct proceedings
is fraught with ethical, professional, and practical peril for an attorney in
practice before that court.
Until we acknowledge that Category 3 misconduct exists and remains
largely unaddressed, we should take little comfort in the Breyer Committee's
reassuring conclusions.255 We certainly can and should devote additional
attention to assessing the extent of Category 3 misconduct; while such data may
not be easy to obtain, an anonymous survey of the bar should be possible. But
given ample evidence that some unreported misconduct exists currently, some
action should be taken now. We must begin with the proverbial first stepadmitting we have a problem-before we can consider how best to address
Category 3 misconduct within the system. Amending the New Misconduct
Rules to restore language explicitly authorizing consideration of anonymous
complaints would be a good start. The chief judges then need to genuinely
consider anonymous complaints and respond to them when the allegations are
serious. 25 6 Finally, the judicial councils and special investigative committees
need to respond to such allegations with sensitivity, not only for the integrity of
the judiciary and the rights of an accused judge-as they do now-but also for
the rights and interests of attorneys, who risk serious professional damage by
raising complaints or cooperating with such investigations.
The attorney-complainant will always be a reluctant tattletale. But the
judicial misconduct system must respect and protect the attorney-complainant if
there is to be reasonable hope of lawyer participation and cooperation. Absent
such participation, the federal judicial misconduct system will continue to
devote the bulk of its energies to processing
257 frivolous and merits-related
complaints from pro se litigants and prisoners, blissfully denying any genuine
misconduct that attorneys may witness and endure, but are reluctant to report.
The third branch of government and, more particularly, the society it serves
deserve better than that.
255. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 327 ("Overall, they suggested that the judiciary was
doing a good job .... "). As noted earlier, the Breyer Committee essentially concluded that
Category 1 misconduct is being handled very well and that Category 2 misconduct can be
handled well with a few adjustments. It did not address, except superficially, the problem of
Category 3 misconduct, which the system is missing entirely. See supra notes 79-86 and
accompanying text.
256. Here, the word "serious" should be interpreted to mean both the gravity and
credibility of the charges.
257. BREYER COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 135-36.

